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MAKING DIFFICULT HEALTH DECISIONS: A MOTIVATED DECISION PROCESSING 
MODEL 
Laura E. Zajac, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011 
 
This study introduces and evaluates a model of motivated health decision processing.  In 
this model, threatening health decision information is thought to lead to two potentially 
incompatible motivations in decision makers: the desire to process information in an effortful 
manner, and the desire to defend against threat.  The model proposes that these dual motivations 
lead to biased but effortful processing of decision options.  The model was tested empirically by 
experimentally manipulating exposure to threatening information and measuring decision 
information processing and decision strategy selection.  Participants (N = 100; age 40+) were 
randomly assigned to one of two groups and exposed to either threatening or non-threatening 
information about skin cancer.  They were asked to read about and choose from five skin cancer 
treatments; a computerized process-tracing tool recorded their pattern of information acquisition 
as they perused the information.  Results showed that compared to participants in the low threat 
condition, participants in the high threat condition were more likely to avoid information about 
death and to use an attribute-based decision strategy.  Participants in the high threat condition 
and participants who used an attribute-based decision strategy were also more likely to make an 
accurate decision.  Post hoc analyses showed that participants in the high threat condition were 
more likely than participants in the low threat condition to use an effective lexicographic 
decision strategy, and that anxiety and impulsivity moderated the relationship between condition 
and decision strategy.  The results of this study suggest that exposure to perceived threats can 
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lead to patients’ avoidance of frightening, but important, information about treatments and to the 
use of heuristic decision strategies while making treatment decisions.            
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
With the decline of medical paternalism, patients bear an increased responsibility for 
their own health decisions. Patients face treatment decisions that force them to consider 
frightening and uncomfortable topics (e.g. illness, pain, and death) and prioritize their own 
preferences and values (e.g. is quality of life more important than length of life?).      
Current medical practice emphasizes informing patients about their treatment options and 
services (Sheridan, Harris, & Woolf, 2004), but research on medical decision making suggests 
that as few as half of patients deliberately process the available information (Green, Hewison, 
Bekker, Bryant, & Cuckle, 2004; van den Berg, et al., 2006).   Although decision aids have been 
developed and researched in an attempt to encourage informed decision making and make these 
decisions easier for patients (O’Connor et al., 1999), there has been little research exploring how 
patients process information and choose decision strategies while making these types of difficult 
health decisions.  Understanding how patients work through difficult health decisions may help 
providers and researchers improve patient decisions and encourage informed decision making.   
Although a number of theories and studies have focused on how threatening health 
information affects information processing (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Witte, 
1992), existing evidence and theory does not specifically address how exposure to threatening 
information affects decision information processing and the selection of treatment options.  The 
current study experimentally tested a model designed to predict decision processing behavior in 
individuals faced with threatening health information.  The study also explored how exposure to 
threatening information affected the selection of treatment options. 
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1.1  Motivated Decision Processing Model  
 
The proposed model (Figure 1) provides a framework for understanding how patients 
process treatment options.  The model draws from existing theories proposing that exposure to 
threatening information leads to dual motivations.  Several theories, including the parallel 
process model (Leventhal, 1970), the extended parallel process model (Witte, 1992), and dual-
process theories of attitude change (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), propose that 
threatening information can have two effects: motivating intensive message processing and 
motivating defensiveness.  The proposed model applies the idea of dual-processes to a health 
decision situation, proposing that people who are making a difficult health decision will 
experience dual motivations as they process decision options.  The dual motivations are thought 
to lead to biased but effortful processing of decision options. 
The proposed model predicts that when individuals face a difficult and serious health 
decision, and are thus exposed to threatening information, they will experience two motivations: 
effort motivation (a desire to engage in effortful processing of decision information) and 
defensive motivation (a desire to protect the self by avoiding threats; Figure 1).  To satisfy both 
motivations, individuals will process decision information in a biased but effortful manner by 
focusing on the reassuring parts of the treatment option information, avoiding the most 
threatening information, and selecting a decision strategy that allows them to avoid making 
difficult health trade-offs.  In essence, patients use the decision-making process as a way of 
coping with a threatening health decision.  The process results in effortful but biased information 
processing.    
 As others have observed (Lieberman & Chaiken, 1992), in order for effortful but biased 
information processing to function as a successful defense mechanism, the change in processing 
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must be subtle enough for users to fool themselves.  The avoidance of threatening information, 
use of an avoidant decision strategy, and increased focus on reassuring information that occurs 
during effortful but biased decision processing is subtle enough to result in a satisfied (i.e. self-
deceived) decision-maker.   
 The self-deception is possible because many people have an intuitive belief that thinking 
harder equates to thinking better (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003).  People also believe that a greater 
effort will protect them from later feelings of regret. For example, a scenario study showed that 
individuals report more regret over a failure when they have engaged in less instrumental effort 
towards the outcome (van Dijk,van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1999).  Although some research 
suggests that increased cognitive effort can reduce certain types of biases (Kennedy, 1993; 
Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996), thinking harder usually does not result in improved cognitive 
processing or lead to better decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003), and in some cases can make it 
worse (Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  The belief that greater effort improves decision quality 
allows decision makers to feel satisfied after putting a great deal of effort into a decision while 
also using an avoidant decision strategy, avoiding threatening information, and focusing effort 
toward reading reassuring parts of the decision information.  The current study identified the 
type of decision strategy participants used and examined to which parts of the information people 
paid attention in order to pick up on subtle processing changes. 
 
1.2 Behavioral Outcomes of Model   
The current study also explored how well the model predicts behavioral outcomes of the 
decision process.  The model has implications for two behavioral outcomes: the accuracy of the 
decision option ultimately selected, and the selection of a default option.  
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 According to the proposed model, patients facing threatening information while making a 
difficult health decision will select an avoidant and therefore sub-optimal decision strategy.  
Decision strategies that avoid trade-offs are not as effective in identifying optimal decision 
options (Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Keren & Bruin de Bruin, 2003).  Therefore, according to the 
model, threatened individuals will be less likely than non-threatened individuals to make an 
accurate decision (e.g. select the optimal option). 
 The study also explored whether threatened decision makers will be more likely than 
non-threatened decision makers to select a default option.  A general preference for avoidant 
decision options has been well-documented in the literature.  People are more likely to choose a 
default option in many situations, from retirement investment allocation (Choi, Laibson, 
Madrian, & Metrick, 2004), to living will construction (Kressel & Chapman, 2007), and organ 
donor designations (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006).  
People also show a strong bias toward choosing the status quo option (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 
1988).  Although there is evidence that a default option choice becomes more likely as a decision 
task becomes more difficult and complex (Agnew & Szykman, 2005; Fleming, Thomas, & 
Dolan, 2010), there has been no research specifically looking at whether threatening information 
leads to greater selection of avoidant decision options.  Given that one of the predictions of the 
proposed model is that threatened decision makers will avoid decision conflict, then it is likely 
that threatened decision makers will also be more likely than non-threatened decision makers to 
select a default option.  By selecting a default option, decision makers can avoid making difficult 
trade-offs.   
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1.3  Threatening Health Information   
 
Individuals facing difficult health treatment decisions face threatening health information 
about possible illness, disability, and death as consequences of treatment options. However, most 
research on the effect of threatening health information on information processing has not looked 
at treatment decision making, but has been done in the context of persuading individuals to 
pursue healthy preventive behaviors (Ruiter, Abraham, & Kok, 2001; Witte, 1992).  In public 
health and fear appeals research, threatening health information is designed to be persuasive, and 
includes materials such as photos of diseased lungs (for smokers; White, Webster, & Wakefield, 
2008) and articles or brochures about the health risks of behaviors such as smoking, overeating, 
and tanning (Witte & Allen, 2000).  The information is thought to be threatening because it 
reminds individuals of potential illness and death that may result from their own actions.  
 In a decision context, decision option information is threatening when it includes 
reminders of illness and death and when decision processing requires making difficult trade-offs 
between important values.  Individuals clearly find information about illness and death 
threatening (Witte & Allen, 2000).  Decision conflict and difficult trade-offs are also perceived 
as threatening and anxiety-inducing (O’Connor et al., 1999, Luce, Bettman, & Payne, 1997).  In 
the current study, threat was manipulated by providing vivid information about illness and death, 
and by experimentally manipulating the difficulty of the trade-offs in the decision. 
 
1.4  Information Processing 
In general, information can be processed in a heuristic or systematic manner.  Heuristic 
processing requires less effort and involves the use of heuristic shortcuts in judgment formation 
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(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989).  Systematic processing is more comprehensive than 
heuristic processing, involves greater effort, and results in greater comprehension and memory 
for information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  In the proposed model, effortful processing is similar 
to systematic processing.   
Information processing can also be biased or objective.  Biased processing can occur 
when an individual is motivated to process only certain parts of a message.  For example, 
someone who receives both positive and negative feedback might only recall the positive 
feedback.  Individuals who feel threatened might be motivated to defend against the perceived 
threat, and they are likely to focus on less threatening parts of a message (Lieberman & Chaiken, 
1992).  On the other hand, individuals motivated by a desire to be accurate are more likely to 
process information objectively (Lundgren & Prislin, 1998).  By engaging in what appears to be 
a systematic approach to a decision, people can come to believe that they are being objective 
(Kunda, 1990).  
Processing that is both biased and effortful can be understood as careful information 
processing that “spins” the information’s message to support the individual’s goals (e.g., to 
reduce a perceived threat or avoid making trade-offs).  In a decision context, people can process 
decision options in an effortful but biased manner by choosing avoidant decision making 
strategies and spending more time processing less threatening (reassuring) parts of the decision 
information, while spending less time processing threatening parts of the information. 
Effortful biased processing is similar to selective exposure to information.  Selective 
exposure research has found that people prefer to read information that is congenial to them and 
that the desire to expose themselves to congenial information arises from a desire to avoid 
cognitive dissonance (Hart, Albarracin, Eagly, Brechan, Lindberg, & Merril, 2009).  However, 
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selective exposure research focuses on information seeking and exposure to information, 
whereas effortful biased processing describes the cognitive processing of information.  The 
current study not only measured what information participants examined as they made the 
decision (which could be explained by selective exposure), but also measured decision strategy 
selection, a more processing-oriented measure that cannot be explained by selective exposure.   
Biased processing is also related to satisficing.  According to Simon (1957), human 
cognitive limitations and the complexity of the environment lead decision makers to set a goal of 
satisficing, or finding a decision option that is adequate rather than necessarily ideal.  Satisficing 
is thought to be an adaptive and beneficial decision behavior (Schwartz, Ward, Monterosso, 
Lyubomirsky, White, & Lehman, 2002), whereas the proposed model suggests that biased 
processing leads to poorer quality decisions.  A decision maker who uses a satisficing strategy 
eliminates options by comparing across attributes and an option that does not meet a cutoff level 
for a specific attribute is eliminated (Payne & Bettman, 2001).  Therefore, effortful biased 
processing and satisficing can be distinguished by examining whether participants compared 
across attributes first, then skipped or made only a cursory glance at options that did not meet a 
cut-off on that attribute.  Participants who are satisficing will compare across attributes early in 
the information acquisition process and subsequently skip over eliminated options.  In contrast, if 
decision makers engage in effortful biased processing, they will spend more time looking at 
reassuring information, less time on threatening information, and should not skip over specific 
options.  
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1.5  Empirical evidence 
 
A number of studies have examined the effect of exposure to threatening information on 
information processing, but there have been no direct tests of the proposed model.  There is, 
however, empirical evidence supporting the following tenets of the model: 
1. Exposure to threatening information leads to effortful processing; 
2. Exposure to threatening information leads to defensive processing; 
3. Exposure to threatening information leads to effortful but biased processing. 
 
1.5.1  Exposure to threatening information leads to effortful processing 
  
Empirical evidence shows that when people view threatening health information, they 
process the information in an effortful manner.  They spend more time focusing on the 
information (Ditto & Lopez, 1992) and energetically scrutinize the quality of the information 
(Eagly, Kulesa, Chen, & Chaiken, 2001; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992 ; Ditto, Scepansky, Monro, 
Apanovitch, & Lockhart, 1998). 
 Threatened individuals also spend more time examining information.  Using a fictitious 
risk factor study design, Ditto & Lopez (1992) found that participants who received threatening 
information about their risk of a serious pancreatic disease spent more time examining the test 
results than did participants who received reassuring information. 
 Threatened individuals also expend a greater amount of energy examining the quality of a 
message.  For example, Liberman & Chaiken (1992) found that participants who read a 
threatening health message about their caffeine consumption reported expending more effort 
 9 
 
while reading the article when compared with participants who read a non-threatening message.  
Another study played an audiotaped message that was either threatening or non-threatening to 
participants’ positions on a social issue, and found that participants who listened to the 
threatening message reported giving more thought and attention to the message and generated 
more written thoughts when compared to participants who listened to a non-threatening message 
(Eagly et al., 2001).  Another study using a fictitious risk factor study design found that 
participants who received threatening information about a health risk were sensitive to the 
probability of alternate explanations for the findings, whereas participants who received non-
threatening information ignored information about the accuracy of the test, suggesting that 
threatened individuals were more thorough in their analysis of available information (Ditto et al., 
1998).  Unfortunately, none of these studies provided both reassuring and threatening 
information to the same group, so it is impossible to discern whether threatened individuals 
expend more effort processing all aspects of a message or whether they concentrate on the 
reassuring or threatening information.  The current study manipulated a threatening decision 
situation while also providing reassuring and threatening decision information in order to 
determine where participants focus their effort. 
 The empirical evidence showing that threatening information leads to effortful processing 
supports the model’s tenet that in a decision context, people who receive threatening health 
decision information are likely to feel motivated to process that information in an effortful 
manner.  The current study manipulates the level of threatening information and then uses 
process variables to measure the amount of effort (operationalized as time) that participants 
made in looking at decision options. 
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  1.5.2  Exposure to threatening information leads to defensive processing 
   
Empirical evidence shows that threatening information prompts defensively motivated 
information processing.  Threatened individuals downplay the seriousness of a threat (de Wit, 
Das, & Vet, 2008; Jemmott, Ditto, & Croyle, 1986; Croyle, Sun, & Louie, 1993; Harris & 
Napper, 2005;), question the accuracy of threatening information (Jemmott, et al., 1986; Croyle 
et al., 1993; Kunda, 1987), and distort their memory for the message contents (Lipkus, McBride, 
Pollak, Lyna, & Bepler, 2004). 
 Individuals who receive threatening information defensively process information by 
minimizing the threat and questioning the accuracy of the threatening information.  For example, 
Jemmott et al. (1986) gave participants threatening information by telling them they had tested 
positive for a (fictitious) risk factor linked to a serious disease, and found that compared to 
participants who received negative results, those who received threatening information rated the 
test lower in accuracy and the disease as less serious.   A study that gave false feedback about 
cholesterol status had similar findings: participants who received threatening information about 
their cholesterol status rated the test as less accurate and rated high cholesterol as a less serious 
threat to health than did participants who received non-threatening information (Croyle et al., 
1993). 
 Receiving threatening information can also prompt defensive processing in the form of 
distorted memory for message contents.  For example, a study that gave smokers feedback about 
whether they were at increased genetic risk for lung cancer found that smokers who received 
threatening information (that they had a high genetic risk for lung cancer) were less likely to 
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accurately recall their test results six months later when compared to smokers who received non-
threatening information (Lipkus et al., 2004). 
 Threatening information clearly leads to defensive processing in the form of downplaying 
threats, questioning the accuracy of information, and misremembering threatening information.  
However, decision situations involve more than simply receiving and processing information; 
decisions also involve the selection of a decision strategy.  Therefore, defensive processing may 
occur somewhat differently in a decision context.  Luce, Bettman, and Payne (1997) exposed 
participants to threatening decision information by manipulating the vividness and consequences 
of a decision, and found that participants who read the more threatening decision scenario used a 
more attribute-based (avoidant) decision strategy when compared to participants who read a less 
threatening scenario.  The present study also manipulated the vividness of a decision scenario 
and used process measures to identify the type of decision strategy selected by participants. 
 
1.5.3  Exposure to threatening information leads to effortful but biased processing   
 
According to the proposed model, dual motivations to process in an effortful and 
defensive manner result in decision information processing that is both effortful and biased.  
Although there is some evidence supporting effortful but biased processing in threatening 
decision situations (Luce et al., 1997), most of the empirical evidence that threatening health 
information leads to biased but effortful information processing comes from the persuasion 
literature (Gleicher & Petty, 1992; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Lord, 
Ross, & Lepper, 1979).   
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 The previously mentioned study by Liberman and Chaiken (1992) found that not only did 
threatened participants report expending more effort reading a threatening article, but they also 
processed the message in a biased manner: they were more critical of threatening parts of the 
message and less critical of reassuring parts.  Unfortunately, the study did not include process 
measures, so it is impossible to know whether the extra effort was spent in looking at the 
threatening or reassuring parts of the message. 
 Other studies have found similar results.  The fictitious risk factor study by Ditto and 
Lopez (1992) found that not only did threatened participants expend more effort interpreting the 
test results, but they were also more critical of the accuracy of the test and interpreted the 
fictitious disease as less of a danger.  Individuals who receive threatening health information 
seem to process the information in an effortful manner, but also seem to be more critical and 
defensive in their interpretation of the message.  
One study specifically looked at whether expectations of reassurance affect the way 
people process threatening information.  Gleicher and Petty (1992) manipulated the level of 
threat in a message, and found that unthreatened participants systematically read a persuasive 
message, but threatened participants only processed the message systematically if they believed 
it to be reassuring.  The results of this study suggest that threatened individuals may expend 
more effort looking at reassuring information in a message and may avoid threatening 
information. 
The only study that examined the effect of threatening information in a decision context 
manipulated the vividness and consequences of a difficult decision and used process variables to 
measure how participants processed the decision (Luce et al., 1997). Results showed that 
compared to people in the low threat condition, people in the high threat condition processed 
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more extensively: they read more information and took more time to make the decision.  
However, people in the high threat condition were more likely than those in the low threat 
condition to choose a processing strategy that avoided explicit trade-offs.  In other words, 
threatening information prompted effortful processing, but it also led to avoidance of decision 
conflict.   
The proposed model predicts that decision makers who receive threatening health 
information will be motivated to engage in effortful and defensive processing of decision 
information.  To satisfy both motivations, the model predicts that individuals will process 
decision information in a biased but effortful manner. The evidence described above supports 
separate parts of the model, but as of yet, there have been no direct tests of predictions from the 
entire proposed model.   
In the decision context of the current study, people who engage in effortful but biased 
decision information processing were expected to select an avoidant decision strategy, spend 
more time on the decision, focus on reassuring information, and avoid threatening information.  
The current study used process measures to measure each of these variables. 
 
1.6  Mediators   
 
Although the model does not include mediators of the effect of threatening information 
on decision information processing, the study included measures designed to explore mediation 
of the main effect. 
 Negative emotion, including anxiety, worry, and fear, is widely thought to be an 
important motivator of health-related information processing and behavior (Ruiter et al., 2001).  
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The current study included several measures of negative emotion in order to explore its role as a 
potential mediator of the effect of threatening information on health decision making.  
 Anticipated regret has also been identified as a predictor of health behavior (Abraham & 
Sheeran, 2004), and it is possible that threatening information may lead to a greater anticipation 
of regret related to making a poor decision.  Previous research suggested that people anticipate 
experiencing greater regret when considering adverse consequences caused by action rather than 
inaction (Ritov & Baron, 1992, 1995 ), suggesting that greater regret might lead to greater use of 
heuristic (less effortful) decision strategies.  However, more recent work was able to reverse that 
effect by manipulating prior outcomes.  Zeelenberg, van de Bos, van Dijk, & Pieters (2002) 
showed that after negative outcomes, people experienced greater regret in response to inaction.  
It is therefore unclear whether anticipated regret will affect decision making, and the current 
study explores whether anticipated regret mediates the effect of threatening information on 
decision strategy selection.   
 
1.7  Decision Making Methodology 
 
An individual’s selection of a decision strategy can be measured and interpreted in many 
ways.  Behavior decision research has established that an “ideal” decision processing strategy 
(i.e. one that is systematic and accurate) is extensive (processing all the relevant information), 
consistent (rather than selective) across options and option attributes, and based on comparing 
options rather than comparing attributes across options (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976; Payne, Bettman, 
& Johnson, 1988).  For example, a potential homeowner selecting from five houses, each of 
which differs on several attributes (e.g. school district, price, quality of kitchen), might carefully 
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consider all of the information about each house, process the same amount of information for 
each house and each dimension, and weight each dimension, summing the weights for each 
house.  This type of strategy reflects systematic processing and requires the decision-maker to 
make explicit trade-offs among attributes (e.g. deciding whether a higher quality school district 
is worth a higher house price).  Other processing strategies allow a decision-maker to avoid 
making explicit trade-offs.  For example, a potential homeowner could set cut-off values for 
attributes (e.g. eliminating houses in poor quality school districts, regardless of price or kitchen 
quality) or simply compare options across a specific important attribute (e.g. choosing the least 
expensive house).   
The current study measures decision strategy and distinguishes between more systematic 
strategies in which the decision maker makes explicit trade-offs, and heuristic or attribute-based 
strategies in which the decision maker avoids trade-offs.  One of the hypotheses in the current 
study is that participants in the high threat condition will be more likely than participants in the 
low threat condition to select an attribute-based decision strategy, thus avoiding explicit trade-
offs.     
Decision strategy selection can be measured using process tracing tools.  Hypermedia 
process tracing was used in the study.  A computer program called MouselabWeb (Willemsen & 
Johnson, 2009) was used to record the information acquisition process of each decision maker in 
the study, and that information will be analyzed to determine whether  participants avoided 
making explicit trade-offs as they made the decision, and whether they processed information in 
a systematic, extensive, and consistent manner.  
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1.8  Hypotheses 
 
 This research tested the predictions made by the motivated decision processing model.  
The study manipulated threatening information in order to explore how exposure to threatening 
information changes decision processes during difficult health decisions. The study tested the 
entire model and used a process tracing tool to examine actual information acquisition behavior. 
The study tested the main effect of exposure to threatening information on decision information 
processing.  Specifically, the hypotheses were: 
 
1. Exposure to threatening information will lead to a greater focus on reassuring parts of 
decision information, avoidance of threatening information, and the use of attribute-based 
(trade-off avoidant) decision strategies. 
2. Exposure to threatening information will lead to the increased use of effortful processing. 
 
Evidence supporting both hypotheses would support the proposed model’s prediction that 
individuals exposed to threatening health information would engage in effortful but biased 
processing of decision information. 
 
1.9 Exploratory Hypotheses 
 
The study also tested several exploratory hypotheses: whether exposure to threatening 
information will lead to the increased selection of a status quo decision option, and whether the 
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main effect of threatening information on decision processing is mediated by negative emotion 
or anticipated regret. 
 
2.0 METHOD 
 
2.1 Overview 
 
 The study used an experimental design and manipulated participants’ level of perceived 
health threat by 1) introducing a threatening or nonthreatening scenario about skin cancer and 2) 
increasing the difficulty of trade-offs during a health decision.  Participants made a health 
treatment decision after looking at a table of information about hypothetical skin cancer 
treatment options.  Decision information was presented using a computerized table and a 
computer program recorded participants’ information acquisition.  One of the treatment options 
(“Oral medication”) was designed to be better than the other options.  After looking at the 
treatment information, participants chose a treatment, and one option was marked as a default 
choice.  Participants also completed measures of mood, anticipated regret, impulsivity, decision 
satisfaction, decision conflict, and perceived confidence in their own judgment of skin cancer 
treatment.   
 
2.2 Design 
 
The study included a high threat condition and a low threat condition.  The manipulation 
included two components.  First, in the high threat condition, participants read a vivid and 
threatening scenario about a skin cancer diagnosis (e.g. “Imagine that a mole on your wrist has 
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changed in shape and become painful to the touch.  You visit your physician and he takes a small 
biopsy.  When you return to the office a week later for the results, your physician enters the 
exam room and says, ‘I have bad news.’”).  Second, the decision trade-offs in this condition were 
difficult.  For example, two of the treatment options forced participants to choose between “some 
risk of immediate death” but “low chance of recurrence” and “low risk of immediate death” but 
“moderate risk of recurrence.”  Participants in the low threat condition read a neutral set of 
instructions on making a decision (e.g. “In the next part of the study, we will ask you to look 
over five skin cancer treatment options.”) and decision trade-offs were designed to be simpler 
(e.g. participants chose between one treatment that offered “low risk of immediate death” and 
“low chance of recurrence” and another that offered “some risk of immediate death” and 
“moderate chance of recurrence”).   
Information processing was measured using a computerized decision information table 
with treatment options (e.g. Deep Tissue Surgery, Laser Treatment) in rows and attributes (e.g., 
benefits, side effects) in columns (see Tables 1 and 2).  Information on each attribute was hidden 
and only visible by mouseover.  The MouselabWeb process tracing program recorded the mouse 
movements of participants, including the amount of time spent mousing over each text box, the 
order in which participants moved between text boxes, and overall decision time.  The table was 
balanced so that each cell included 9-12 words. 
In order to make it possible to measure of the quality of the decision, the decision options 
were designed so that one of the options (Oral Treatment) was subtly dominant over the other 
four options.  The dominant option, when compared to the other four options, was a better 
balance of risks and benefits (e.g. minor side effects, very low risk of cancer recurrence) and 
included the highest chance of reaching the goals of avoiding cancer recurrence, death from skin 
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cancer, and major side effects.  Also, in order to delay the actual decision and assess information 
processing separately from the actual decision selection, participants were told that they would 
see information on five treatment options, but that they would not yet know which of those five 
options would be available. Participants viewed the decision information on the computer first 
and then later selected a decision option on paper.   
  One of the decision options was pre-selected in order to act as a default option.  
However, participants did not know that a default option existed while they processed the 
information.  The default option was randomly assigned among the four non-dominant choice 
options.  The decision table was pre-tested during pilot testing in order to establish clarity and 
dominance of the decision option.   
 
2.3 Pilot testing 
 
 Pilot testing was conducted to test the strength of the manipulation, clarity of the decision 
table, and dominance of the optimal option.  Pilot test participants were the first 20 individuals 
who responded to on-campus voice-mail recruitment advertisements.   
Participants in the high threat condition reported feeling significantly more worried about 
skin cancer (“At this moment, how worried do you feel about skin cancer?”; scale ranged from 1 
[not at all] to 7 [extremely]; high threat: M  = 3.29 [1.70], low threat: M  = 2.70 [1.01], t = 4.49, p 
< .001) and indicated that the scenario was significantly more threatening when compared to 
ratings made by the low threat participants (“How threatening is the information in this 
scenario?”; scale ranged from 1 [not at all threatening] to 7 [extremely threatening]; high threat: 
M  = 5.00 [1.41], low threat: M  = 1.50 [0.92], t = 6.45, p < .001).   
 20 
 
 During the debriefing, participants reported that the information in the decision table was 
clear.  In the decision satisfaction questionnaire, nearly all participants strongly agreed or agreed 
with the statements: “I know which options are available to me” (A 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 [strongly agree] to 5 [strongly disagree]: M = 1.45 [.51]; 55% selected strongly agree, 
45% selected agree), “I know the benefits of each option” (M = 1.65 [.59]; 40% selected strongly 
agree, 55% selected agree), “I know the risks and side effects of each option” (M = 1.70 [.57]; 
35% selected strongly agree, 60% selected agree).  The pilot results suggested that the 
information about the treatment options was clear and understandable to participants. 
Nearly half (45%) of the pilot participants selected the optimal option (oral medication), 
suggesting that it was dominant enough without being too obvious (all of the other options were 
selected at least once by participants). 
Since the pilot data indicated that the manipulation had a strong effect on worry and 
perceived message threat, I used the manipulation in the full study.  If pilot testing had shown the 
manipulation to be ineffective, I would have adjusted the manipulation and completed another 
pilot study.  To ensure that the pilot participants were representative of the larger sample, I 
conducted manipulation check analyses on the larger sample of participants who were not 
included in the pilot study.  The results showed that non-pilot participants in the high threat 
condition reported feeling significantly more worried about skin cancer (high threat: M = 5.55 
[1.41], low threat: M  = 1.93 [1.30], t = 141.69, p < .001) and indicated that the scenario was 
significantly more threatening when compared to ratings made by the low threat participants 
(high threat: M  = 5.35 [1.90], low threat: M  = 2.63 [1.61], t = 47.77, p < .001).  The results of 
these analyses did not differ from the manipulation check results based on the entire sample, and 
so the entire sample (including the pilot participants) was used in analyses. 
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2.4 Participants 
 
 One hundred and two men and women from the community participated in the study.  
Participants were recruited through advertising on an online classified ad site, a university-
affiliated research registry, a medical center staff newsletter, and a voicemail newsletter sent to 
university and medical center staff.  Two participants were removed from the sample because of 
technical problems with the MouseLabWeb program, leaving a total sample of 100.  Exclusion 
criteria included a previous diagnosis of skin cancer and the inability to read English.  Mean age 
was 52.13 (SD = 8.01).   Because the majority of people diagnosed with melanoma, the most 
dangerous type of skin cancer, are over age 40 (National Cancer Institute, 2008), individuals 
younger than 40 years of age were excluded from the study.  The sample was largely female 
(78%), white (78%), and well-educated (60% reported having a college or post-graduate degree).    
Participants received $10 after participating.   
 
2.5 Questionnaire Measures 
 
 Questionnaire measures included measures of worry about skin cancer, mood (Positive 
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS); Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), anticipated regret, trait 
anxiety (State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; Spielberger, 1983; items include statements such as, “I 
feel nervous and restless,” and “I am calm, cool, and collected.”), impulsivity (Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995; items include statements such as, “I plan 
tasks carefully” and “I have “racing” thoughts.”), Satisfaction with Decision Scale (Sainfort & 
Booske, 2000; 6-item scale includes statements such as, “I am satisfied that I made a good 
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decision.”), Decisional Conflict Scale (a scale developed specifically as a way to evaluate health 
care consumer decision aids; O’Connor, 1995; items include statements such as, “I know the 
benefits of each option,” and “I am clear about the best choice for me.”), demographic 
information, and perceived confidence in one’s own judgment of skin cancer treatment (see 
Table 3).   
 
2.6 Information Processing Measures 
 
Several measures of information processing taken from the process tracing tool were used 
to determine each participant’s level of biased systematic information processing.  Measures 
included the total time spent making the decision, the amount of information examined, the 
proportion of time spent looking at the “Benefits of treatment” column and “Likelihood of 
immediate death” column, and the decision strategy used. 
First, the total time spent making the decision was calculated by adding together the time 
spent mousing over boxes in the decision matrix.  Participants who spent more time in the matrix 
were assumed to have spent more effort looking at the information.  The number of boxes a 
participant moused over was also counted, with a greater number of boxes opened indicating a 
greater level of effort.  Previous studies have used these measures of time for calculating level of 
decision effort (Drolet & Luce, 2004; Luce et al., 1997). 
In order to measure the amount of biased processing that occurred, the proportion of time 
participants spent looking at the reassuring parts of the information (e.g., Benefits of treatment) 
was calculated.  Participants in the high threat condition who processed in a biased way were 
expected to spend a greater proportion of time looking at the less threatening information.  The 
 23 
 
proportion of time participants spent looking at the most threatening parts of the information 
(e.g., likelihood of immediate death) was also calculated.  Participants in the high threat 
condition who processed in a biased way were expected to spend a smaller proportion of time 
looking at the less threatening information.   
Finally, each participant’s decision strategy was identified.  By examining the pattern of 
information acquisition, it was possible to determine whether participants used an extensive, 
systematic, and consistent (optimal) strategy or avoidant decision strategy.  In an optimal 
decision strategy, participants make an overall judgment of each option, systematically looking 
through each option’s attributes.  For example, an optimal decision approach would be to look 
through all the attributes of Treatment 1 (Benefits, Side effects, Long term risks, etc.) before 
moving on the Treatment 2.  In contrast, participants using an avoidant strategy would compare 
each treatment option along a single dimension.  For example, an avoidant strategy would be to 
look through the Benefits for each treatment (Treatment 1, Treatment 2, etc.), thus avoiding 
making trade-offs (since the decision maker would be able to simply select an option based on 
which has the best benefits).   
Decision strategy was calculated by first counting the number of times a participant made 
comparisons between attributes.  That number was then compared to the number of times the 
participant made comparisons between treatment options.  The number of times a participant 
transitioned between attributes within the same treatment option (e.g., while looking at 
Treatment 3, the participant first moused over a box containing information on Side effects, 
followed by a mouseover of a box containing information on Long-term risk) were added 
together, and the number of transitions between treatment options was subtracted from the 
attribute-transition total.  The sum was divided by the total number of boxes opened during the 
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experiment, and the resulting number, ranging from -1 to 1, indicated the decision strategy used 
by the participant.  Lower scores indicate a more attribute-based or avoidant strategy.  This 
method of calculating decision strategy has been used in other studies of decision processing 
(Drolet & Luce, 2004; Glockner & Betsch, 2008; Luce et al., 1997; Reisen, Hoffrage, & Mast, 
2008).  
 
2.7 Procedure 
 
 A diagram illustrating the experimental procedure is in Figure 2.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to the high threat or low threat condition. Participants completed the study 
individually.  They first completed an informed consent form and learned that the purpose of the 
study was to find out more about how people make health decisions.  Participants in both 
conditions then completed questionnaires assessing their level of fear, worry, and anxiety about 
skin cancer as well as the Trait Anxiety Measure (Spielberger, 1983) and two questions designed 
to assess participants’ confidence in their own judgments of skin cancer treatments (“How 
confident do you feel about your judgments/assessment of skin cancer treatments”).  Responses 
to the items assessing confidence in treatment judgments were later examined to assess whether 
that confidence affects the perception of threatening information.  Questions about heart disease 
were included in the questionnaire to avoid priming participants to the relevance of skin cancer.  
Participants then spent several minutes learning how to use the Mouselab Web program using a 
simple, non-health decision task.   
Participants then received instructions for the main decision task.  Participants in both 
conditions were told that they would make a hypothetical decision about treatment for skin 
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cancer.  However, participants in the high threat condition read a vivid description of the 
decision situation (“Imagine that you have noticed that a mole on your wrist has changed in 
shape and become painful to the touch…Your physician says, “This type of skin cancer is rare 
and dangerous.  If untreated it will quickly spread to other parts of your body and you will die 
from it.”… “Right now there are 5 treatment options, but I’m not sure which ones are covered by 
your insurance.”  He gives you a list of treatments along with their short and long-term 
outcomes, benefits, and side effects.  .”) 
Participants in the neutral condition received a bland and neutral description of the task 
(“In the next part of the study, we will ask you to look over 5 skin cancer treatment 
options…You will see information about the different treatments…Please look over the options, 
and in 5 minutes, the experimenter will give you a list of which treatments are available and then 
you can choose what you think is the best of the available options.”).  In order to delay the actual 
decision and thus assess information processing separately from the actual decision selection, 
participants in both conditions were told that it was possible that not all of the options would be 
available when it was time to make a decision.  In order to control for level of motivation, 
participants in both conditions were told that they would receive feedback on the quality of their 
decision following the decision task.   
Participants next completed a brief manipulation check questionnaire (“How threatening 
is the information in this scenario?”; scale ranged from 1 [not at all threatening] to 7 [extremely 
threatening]; “At this moment, how worried do you feel about skin cancer”; scale ranged from 1 
[not at all worried] to 7 [extremely worried]).  Participants were then presented with the 
Mouselab Web decision matrix (see Tables 1 and 2) and given instructions to look over the 
information.  After they finished looking at the decision table, they completed another 
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questionnaire assessing the level of threat of the decision information (“How threatening was the 
information about the skin cancer treatment options”  and “How frightening was the information 
about the skin cancer treatment options”; scale ranged  from 1 [not at all] to 7 [extremely]), a 
brief version of the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988), and a question about anticipated regret (“How 
afraid are you of regretting your decision?”; scale ranged from 1 [not at all] to 5 [extremely]).  
After completing the brief questionnaire they viewed a list of the treatment options with 
one option selected (the status quo option).  The instructions read, “You can select from any of 
the 5 options.  Because there are multiple options, the computer randomly selected one.  You 
may select a different option if you prefer.”  After making their decision, participants completed 
the Satisfaction with Decision Scale (Sainfort & Booske, 2000), the Decisional Conflict Scale 
(O’Connor, 1995), the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (Patton et al., 1995), and demographic 
measures. 
 
3.0 RESULTS 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
The high threat and low threat conditions did not differ significantly on age, gender, 
education, ethnicity, or baseline level of worry about skin cancer (ps > .20).   
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
3.2 Manipulation Check 
 
 3.2.1 Worry/Threat 
 
Replicating the findings of the pilot data, the results of ANOVAs conducted on the entire 
sample of 100 participants found that the manipulation was effective:  participants in the high 
threat group perceived the scenario as more threatening (M  = 5.44 [1.42] vs M  = 1.84 [1.25], t = 
13.47, p  < .001; “How threatening is the information in this scenario?”) and reported higher 
levels of worry about skin cancer immediately after reading the scenario (M  = 5.34 [1.81] vs M  
= 2.64 [1.51], t = 8.09, p  < .001; “At this moment, how worried do you feel about skin 
cancer?”).  After looking over the treatment options, participants in the high threat condition 
perceived the information as more frightening (M = 3.87 [1.74] vs M  = 2.98 [1.70], t = 2.52, p  = 
.014; “How frightening was the information about the skin cancer treatment options?”), but only 
marginally more threatening (M  = 3.28 [1.59] vs M  = 2.76 [1.51], t = 1.68, p  = .10; “How 
threatening was the information about the skin cancer treatment options?”). 
 
3.2.2 Negative mood 
 
Participants completed the PANAS immediately after viewing the decision table.  T-tests 
showed that participants in the high threat group reported significantly more negative affect 
when compared to the low threat group (see Table 3; M = 24.35 [10.26] vs M  = 16.76 [4.91], t = 
4.50, p < .01).  There was no difference in positive affect between the groups. 
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3.2.3 Decision conflict and satisfaction 
 
  Two additional measures designed to assess level of decision conflict (Decisional 
Conflict Scale, O’Connor, 1995) and level of decision satisfaction (Satisfaction with Decision 
Scale, Sainfort & Booske, 2000) were also analyzed to assess whether the manipulation 
increased the level of decision conflict experienced by participants in the high threat condition.  
Contrary to expectations, there was no significant difference in reported level of decision conflict 
between conditions (high threat: M = 29.36 [9.42], low threat: M = 32.62 [9.01], p = .08; higher 
scores indicate greater level of reported conflict).  In addition, and surprisingly, participants in 
the high threat condition reported a greater level of satisfaction with their decision (M = 24.6 
[3.77]) than did the low threat participants (M  = 23.0 [3.50], p = .030). 
 
3.3 Decision Strategy Measure 
 
Prior to analyses of decision strategy, time to decision, and number of boxes opened, 
demographic variables were assessed to determine whether to control for demographics.  
Education level was correlated with several outcome measures (total time to decision [r  = .21 , p 
< .05], number of boxes opened [r  = .27 , p < .01], decision strategy selection [r  = -.38 , p < 
.01]), and so was controlled for in most analyses. 
To assess the validity of the decision strategy measure, a binary logistic regression 
analysis was conducted to explore whether the decision strategy measure predicted participants’ 
selection of the optimal treatment option.  If the decision strategy score is a valid measure of 
effective information processing, a higher (i.e., more option-based and extensive) decision 
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processing score should predict selection of the optimal option. The analysis showed that the 
decision strategy score significantly predicted selection of the optimal treatment option (B = -
1.60, Wald = 6.31, p < .05); however, contrary to expectations, participants with a lower (i.e., 
more attribute-based) decision strategy score were more likely to select the optimal treatment 
option.  In other words, participants who used an avoidant decision strategy actually made better 
decisions.  This finding brings into question the validity of the decision strategy measure, given 
the expectations that participants who used a more extensive, option-based strategy would be 
more likely to select the optimal option.  Post-hoc analyses using a revised decision strategy 
measure are discussed later.     
 The study included two measures of effortful decision processing: comparing the number 
of boxes opened and the overall time to decision.  A logistic regression analysis found that the 
total time to decision did not predict decision strategy.  However, a linear regression analysis 
found that the number of boxes opened significantly predicted the type of decision strategy 
participants used (β = .56, t [98] = -6.62, p < .001).  Participants who looked at more information 
used a more extensive decision strategy.  An additional analysis, aimed at establishing the 
validity of the measures of effortful decision processing, looked at whether opening more boxes 
or spending more time on the decision led to greater selection of the optimal option.  Results 
showed that the number of boxes opened significantly predicted selection of the optimal 
treatment option (B = .029, Wald = 8.72, p = .003), but that the total time spent making the 
decision was not predictive of selection of the optimal option (B = .00, Wald = 2.57, p = .12).   
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3.4  Other Measures 
 
 Table 3 lists the means by condition and descriptions of the questionnaire measures used.   
Measures of confidence in one’s judgment of skin cancer treatments, baseline measures of skin 
cancer worry, and trait measures of anxiety and impulsivity did not predict decision strategy, 
selection of the best decision option, number of boxes opened, or overall time to decision.  
Therefore, these measures were not included as control variables in other analyses. 
 
3.5 Behavioral Data 
 
 The process measures included in this study were designed to assess how participants 
made their decision.  However, prior to analyzing the process variables, I first examined 
participants’ actual decision behavior.  Which option did participants ultimately choose?   
 The decision options were designed so that one option (“oral treatment”) dominated the 
others.  In addition, for each participant, one of the four non-optimal options was randomly 
selected to be a status quo selection: it was pre-checked and participants could either leave that 
option selected or choose a different option.    
 The results of a logistic regression analysis with condition as the IV and choice of the 
status quo option as the DV, controlling for education, show that contrary to the exploratory 
hypothesis, participants in the high threat condition were no more likely than those in the low 
threat condition to choose the status quo option (B= -.18, Wald = .16, p = .68).  Level of threat 
therefore did not predict selection of a status quo option.  However, across conditions, 
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participants selected the status quo option significantly more frequently than expected (30% of 
participants selected the status quo option (20% expected); X2 [1, N = 100] = 6.25, p = .012). 
 Surprisingly, participants in the high threat condition were significantly more likely than 
those in the low threat condition to select the optimal option (see Figure 3).  A logistic regression 
analysis, controlling for education, found the difference between the groups to be significant (B= 
-.92, Wald = 4.29, p < .05).  This finding is contrary to expectations; according to the proposed 
theory and the hypotheses, participants under high threat should process in an effortful but biased 
manner, resulting in sub-optimal processing and the selection of a non-optimal option.  However, 
this behavioral finding shows that participants under high threat instead identified and selected 
the best option.  
 In order to understand how high threat participants ultimately came to choose the optimal 
option, we turn to the process data.  What information did participants under high threat focus on 
or avoid, and what type of decision strategy did they use?        
 
3.6 Process Data 
 
 Process measures provided information on the level of effort participants made as they 
processed the decision information, the amount of bias they showed in avoiding or focusing on 
specific information, and the decision strategy they used. 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 3.6.1 Effortful processing 
 
 Two variables, the total time spent making the decision and the number of information 
boxes opened, were used to define the level of effort participants made in processing the decision 
information.  Contrary to the hypotheses, ANCOVAs (controlling for education) showed that 
there was no difference in either total time or number of boxes opened between the high threat 
and low threat conditions (see Table 4).   
 
 3.6.2 Biased processing 
 
 In order to assess the level of biased processing participants engaged in, I calculated the 
proportion of time spent looking at the “Benefits of Treatment” and “Chance of Immediate 
Death” attributes.  Proportion of time was calculated by dividing the amount of time each 
participant spent reading the “Benefits” and “Immediate Death” attribute boxes by the total time 
spent in the entire decision table.  An ANCOVA (controlling for education) found that there was 
no difference by condition in the proportion of time participants spent looking at the Benefits of 
Treatment (F [1,98] = 2.15, p = .15; see Table 4).  However, consistent with hypothesis 1, 
participants in the high threat condition spent a significantly smaller proportion of time looking 
at the Chance of Immediate Death attribute (High threat M = .15 (15% of time), Low threat M = 
.22 (22% of time); F [1,98] = 3.86, p = .053; see Table 4). 
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 3.6.3  Decision strategy 
 
As described earlier, the decision strategy calculation was designed to assess whether 
participants were making an overall judgment of each individual option and comparing options 
to each other (extensive decision strategy), or whether they were looking at how options differed 
along individual attributes (attribute-based strategy).  The results of an ANCOVA showed that 
there was no difference in decision strategy between the two conditions (F [1,98] = .007, p = .93; 
see Table 4). 
 
3.7 Alternative processing strategies 
 
 The information acquisition data were further examined to assess whether participants 
were using a satisificing strategy or engaging in selective exposure to information.   
 
3.7.1 Satisficing 
 
 Satisficing is a type of heuristic processing in which the decision maker searches for the 
first available alternative that meets a certain set of criteria.  If participants in this study used a 
satisficing strategy, then an analysis of the process data should show that participants who were 
satisficing compared across attributes, then skipped over some treatment options.   
To determine whether participants compared across attributes early in the decision 
process, I coded the process data to identify participants who viewed at least four attributes in a 
row during the first half of their information acquisition time (e.g., a participant looked at 
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“Benefits of Treatment” boxes for Deep Tissue Surgery, Shallow Tissue Surgery, Oral 
Treatment, and Laser Treatment sequentially).  Twenty-nine participants viewed at least four 
attributes in a row during the first half of their information acquisition (14 were in the High 
threat condition and 14 were in the Low threat condition). 
Next I determined whether participants skipped or only made a cursory glance at an 
option.  I defined “cursory glance” as one that was more than one standard deviation below the 
participant’s mean time spent in each box.  I first calculated the amount of time per box each 
participant spent by option (e.g., participant X spent an average of 5 seconds looking at each 
Laser Treatment box).  Then I compared that number to the overall mean time per box for each 
participant, and noted which participants spent more than 1 standard deviation below their own 
mean box time in a specific option (e.g. Participant X’s overall mean box time was 7 seconds 
[SD = 2], but he spent less than 5 seconds per Oral Treatment box).  Participants who spent more 
than 1 standard deviation below their overall mean box time viewing boxes in a specific option 
were coded as having made only a cursory glance at an option (19 participants made a cursory 
glance at least one option; 10 in the High threat condition and 9 in the Low threat condition). 
Finally, participants were coded as to whether they used a satisficing strategy:  did they 
view at least four attributes in a row during the first half of their information acquisition and 
make a cursory glance at a minimum of one option?  Overall, 14 participants used a satisficing 
strategy, but a chi-square analyses did not find a significant difference between conditions.  In 
short, some participants (up to 14%) may have used a satisficing strategy, yet condition did not 
seem to have a differential effect on satisficing behavior. 
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3.7.2 Selective exposure to information 
 
 To assess whether high threat participants engaged in a greater level of selective 
exposure to information (i.e., seeking information that was congenial to them), I examined 
whether they spent more time with reassuring information without adjusting their decision 
strategy.  As reported earlier, high threat participants spent a significantly smaller proportion of 
time looking at information on the chance of immediate death, but they did not spend more time 
looking at information on the benefits of treatment.  At the same time, as reported earlier, high 
threat and low threat participants used the same type of decision strategy (see Table 4).  Thus, 
there is some support for the idea that participants in the high risk condition may have engaged 
in selective exposure to information, given that they avoided threatening information without 
changing their decision strategy. 
 
3.8 Summary of main hypotheses 
 
3.8.1 Hypothesis 1  
 
The first hypothesis predicted that participants in the high threat condition would spend 
proportionally more time looking at the reassuring information (“Benefits of treatment”), less 
time looking at threatening information (“Likelihood of immediate death”), and use a more 
attribute-based decision strategy.  Analyses showed that there was no difference between 
conditions on time spent looking at “Benefits of treatment,” that the high threat group spent a 
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smaller proportion of time looking at information about death, and that there was no difference 
by condition in decision strategy (see Table 4).   
 
3.8.2 Hypothesis 2 
 
The second hypothesis predicted that participants in the high threat condition would 
expend more effort than participants in the low threat condition by opening more boxes and 
spending more time making the decision. Analyses found no difference in the amount of time or 
number of boxes opened between conditions (F [1, 98] = .14, p = .71; F [1, 98] = .10, p = .76) 
and found that high threat participants did avoid threatening information (e.g., “Immediate 
Death” information), but did not spend more time with reassuring information.   
 
 3.8.3 Exploratory hypotheses 
 
The study tested two exploratory hypotheses: whether exposure to threatening 
information will lead to the increased selection of a status quo decision option, and whether the 
main effect of threatening information on decision processing is mediated by negative emotion 
or anticipated regret. 
 
3.8.3.1 Status quo option   
 
The results of a logistic regression analysis showed that contrary to the exploratory 
hypothesis, participants in the high threat condition were no more likely than those in the low 
 37 
 
threat condition to choose the status quo option (B = -.18, Wald = .16, p = n.s.).  Level of threat 
did not predict selection of a status quo option. 
 
3.8.3.2 Mediation 
 
In order to test the exploratory hypothesis that the effect of threatening information on 
decision processing is mediated by negative emotion or anticipated regret, mediational analyses 
were conducted.  In their comparison of methods of assessing mediation effects, MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002), found the Sobel test (Sobel, 1982) and its 
variants to result in the most accurate Type I error rates and to have greater power than the Baron 
and Kenny (1986) method to detect small and medium effect sizes.  Therefore, the Sobel test 
(1982) was used to assess the indirect effect of condition on intentions through reported worry.  
A Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS; SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois) macro 
developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) was used to test whether the indirect effect of condition 
on intention through worry was significantly different from zero.  The macro tests the indirect 
effect using the Sobel test (1982), by determining whether there is a significant difference 
between the total effect (condition predicting intention) and the direct effect (condition 
predicting intention with the mediator in the equation).  The indirect effect of the mediator is the 
difference between the total effect and the direct effect.   
 
Negative emotion and worry.   Linear regression analyses (controlling for education) found that 
the main effect of negative emotion (measured by the PANAS) on the proportion of time 
participants spent looking at information on the chance of immediate death and side effects was 
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not significant (immediate death: B = -.028, t = -.27, p = .79; side effects: B = -.54, t = -.53, p = 
.60).  Similar analyses looking at the main effect of worry (measured immediately after the 
manipulation) on the two variables found that the effect was also not significant (immediate 
death: B = -.074, t = -.76, p = .45; side effects: B = -.12, t = -1.25, p = .22).  A linear regression 
analysis looking at the main effect of negative emotion on optimal decision choice found a trend 
such that the higher participants’ reported negative emotion, the more likely participants were to 
select the optimal option (B = .18, t = 1.80, p = .083).   However, a linear regression analysis 
looking at the main effect of worry on optimal decision choice was not significant (B = .15, t = 
1.51, p = .14). 
Contrary to expectations, neither negative emotion (measured by the PANAS) nor worry 
about skin cancer mediated the effect of condition on the proportion of time participants spent 
looking at information on the chance of immediate death and side effects.  Additional analyses 
found that negative emotion and skin cancer worry also did not mediate the main effect of 
condition on optimal decision choice. 
 
Anticipated regret.  An ANCOVA (controlling for education) found that participants in the high 
threat condition reported a higher level of fear of regretting their decision (“I am afraid of 
regretting my decision”; scale ranged from 1 [very slightly or not at all] to 5 [extremely]; high 
threat: M = 1.98, low threat: M = 1.22; F [1, 91] = 15.7, p <.001).  However, mediational 
analyses found that anticipated regret did not mediate the main effect of condition on time 
looking at information on death and side effects, or the main effect of condition on optimal 
decision choice.  
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3.9 Post-hoc analyses  
 
Although the results reported above partially support the hypothesis that individuals 
under high threat avoid threatening information, the surprising finding that participants under 
high threat made better decisions than those under low threat is thus far unexplained by the 
process data.  Also unexplained is why participants who used an attribute-based, avoidant 
decision strategy were more likely to select the optimal option.  To explore these unexpected 
behavioral findings, a series of post-hoc analyses was performed.   
The first set of post-hoc analyses look at two explanations for why attribute-based 
decision strategy use predicted the selection of the optimal option.  First, the decision strategy 
measure may not have been a valid measure of attribute-based (avoidant) and option-based 
(extensive) decision processing.  To explore this possibility, I developed an alternative measure 
of decision strategy.  Second, participants may have used an effective heuristic decision strategy 
that was not captured by the process measure variables reported above.  I further analyzed the 
process data to discover whether a satisficing or lexicographic decision strategy could explain 
the behavioral data. 
The second set of post-hoc analyses explore whether individual difference variables can 
explain differences in the behavioral data.  Subgroups of the sample, such as those with high or 
low levels of trait anxiety or impulsivity, may have been differentially affected by the 
manipulation.    
 
 
 
 40 
 
 3.9.1 Alternative decision strategy analyses 
 
 The decision strategy measure used in the initial analyses was used previously in decision 
research about making a charitable donation decision (Luce et al., 1997) and choosing an 
apartment (Drolet & Luce, 2004).   Because the studies did not include an objective measure of 
the validity of the decision strategy measure, it is possible that the measure is not an objectively 
valid one and does not accurately measure attribute-based and option-based decision strategies.  
However, the decision content of the current study is different in its level of complexity and 
familiarity when compared to the decision information in previous studies, providing one 
explanation for why this measure did not work well in the current study.  The previous studies 
used familiar attributes; in Luce et al. (1997), participants looked over information about 
children and the attributes included age, intelligence level, and family size.  In Drolet and Luce 
(2004), participants looked over apartment options with attributes such as rent and square 
footage.  The attributes in previous studies were more likely to be familiar to participants than 
the attributes in this study (i.e., likelihood of immediate death, benefits of treatment, short term 
risks, etc.).  It is possible that participants in the current study spent the first few moments of the 
decision task getting acquainted with the attribute categories before settling on a decision 
strategy, and that the first few boxes opened should be disregarded.  
 In addition, the decision strategy measure used in previous studies did not incorporate 
time into the measure.  Decision strategy was simply a measure of the number of times 
participants compared across options or across attributes.  Because the current study included 
more information about each attribute than did previous studies, it is possible that incorporating a 
measure of the amount of time spent comparing across attributes and across options rather than 
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simply counting the number of transitions between attributes and options would improve the 
validity and accuracy of the decision processing measure. 
 To construct a new measure of decision processing, I looked at the raw information 
acquisition data and examined the pattern of information acquisition.  I found that participants 
spent significantly more time looking at the first five boxes they opened when compared to the 
rest of the boxes they viewed (Time in first five boxes, M = 5.00 seconds [4.48], Time in all 
other boxes M = 3.35 seconds [2.75]; F [60.28], t = 8.50, df = 2079, p < .01).  Participants may 
have spent time getting acquainted with the attributes and options before settling on a decision 
strategy.  Therefore, I disregarded the first five boxes opened for all participants. 
 Next, to incorporate time into the decision measure, I calculated how much time 
participants spent comparing sequentially within the same attribute and within the same option 
(e.g. Participant X spent 15 seconds comparing across the Benefits attribute: first looking at 
Benefits for Treatment 1, then Benefits for Treatment 2, and finally Benefits for Treatment 3.  
Participant Y spent 20 seconds comparing Treatment 1 across several attributes: first Side 
Effects for Treatment1, then Risk of Immediate Death for Treatment 1, then Benefits for 
Treatment 1). This measure was designed to assess how much time participants spent comparing 
within a single attribute or option. 
 Within participants, the attribute time was summed and the option time was summed.  To 
get a final measure of decision strategy, total attribute time was subtracted from total option time 
to get a number representing the time spent comparing across options minus the time spent 
across attributes.  A larger number signifies spending more time comparing across options (a 
more extensive decision strategy); smaller numbers represent greater comparison across 
attributes (a more attribute-based decision strategy).    
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 I conducted a logistic regression analysis with the revised decision strategy measure as 
the IV and selection of the optimal option as the DV.  The results showed that the revised 
strategy measure did not significantly predict selection of the optimal option (B = .00, Wald = 
5.039, p = .025).  In a further analysis, I divided the sample into quartiles based on the revised 
decision strategy measure. Looking only at participants in the top and bottom quartiles (those 
who used the most extensive and most attribute-based strategies), I conducted another logistic 
regression analyses with decision strategy as the IV and selection of the optimal option as the 
DV.  The results showed that participants using the more attribute-based strategy were more 
likely to select the optimal option (B = -1.71, Wald = 6.33, p = .012).   
 An ANOVA assessed whether the revised decision strategy measure differed by 
condition, and the results showed no significant differences in decision strategy by condition 
(high threat, M = 40.64 seconds [47.69]; low threat, M = 45.21 seconds [56.68]; F [1, 99] = .19, 
p =.66). 
 The revised decision strategy measure replicated the earlier finding that participants who 
used an avoidant strategy by comparing across attributes were more likely to select the optimal 
option.  The next analysis looks at whether participants used an effective heuristic decision 
strategy to identify the optimal option. 
 
 3.9.2 Choice heuristics 
 
 Several decision strategies have been identified in the literature (Payne & Bettman, 
2001).  Two of the strategies, the weighted adding strategy and the equal weight strategy, occur 
when the decision maker compares across options, makes trade-offs, and processes extensively.  
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These strategies are considered normatively appropriate strategies (Frisch & Clemen, 1994) and 
are the types of strategies that generally lead to more accurate decisions (Payne & Bettman, 
2001).  The two decision strategy measures used in the current paper assess both the frequency 
and amount of time spent comparing across options and across attributes, and are therefore 
effective measures of variants of the weighted adding and equal weight strategies. 
 Other decision strategies include choice heuristics: strategies aimed at simplifying 
decisions.  They include satisficing and lexicographic decision strategies.  Satisficing, discussed 
earlier, involves the elimination of options that do not meet a cutoff level for each attribute.  A 
lexicographic strategy occurs when the decision maker identifies the most important attribute, 
then looks across that attribute and selects the option with the best value on that attribute (Payne 
& Bettman, 2001).  It is possible that participants who selected the optimal option did so after 
effectively using one of the above heuristic strategies.   
 
3.9.2.1 Satisficing 
  
 The satisficing strategy measure discussed previously in this paper was used to test 
whether participants who used a satisficing strategy were more likely to select the best treatment 
option.  A chi-square test was not significant (X2 (1, N = 100) = .20, p = .20). 
 
3.9.2.2 Lexicographic  
 
 A lexicographic strategy occurs when the decision maker identifies the most important 
attribute, then looks across that attribute and selects the option with the best value on that 
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attribute (Payne & Bettman, 2001).  To assess whether participants used a lexicographic strategy, 
it was important to first assess whether participants identified a particular attribute as the most 
important.  An analysis of the time spent looking at individual attributes found that participants 
spent significantly more time looking at the Long Term Risks attribute when compared to time 
spent on the other attributes (see Figure 4).  The Long Term Risks attribute included information 
on the long-term risks of scarring and permanent pain, but most importantly, information on the 
long-term likelihood of cancer recurrence.  It seems reasonable that participants would identify 
likelihood of recurrence as the most important attribute to look at when making a cancer 
treatment decision1.   
   I analyzed lexicographic strategy both categorically (i.e. participants who used a 
lexicographic strategy vs those who did not) and by looking at the amount of time participants 
spent using a lexicographic strategy on a specific attribute.   
In order to determine whether participants used a lexicographic strategy, I examined the 
amount of time each participant spent comparing across the Long Term Risk attribute (e.g. 
Participant X looked at Long Term Risk for treatment 2, then immediately afterwards for 
treatment 3, and then for treatment 5, for a total time of 19 seconds).  Participants were coded 
categorically into those who compared across the Long Term Risk attribute (N = 74) and those 
who did not (N = 26).    
                                                 
1 Because of its content, the “Likelihood of Immediate Death” attribute could also be objectively considered to be 
the most important attribute; however, participants did not spend any more time on the Death attribute than they did 
less important attributes such as Short Term Risks and Side Effects.   I conducted an analysis to examine whether 
participants who did not compare across the Long Term Risk attribute instead compared across the Death attribute.  
A one-way ANOVA was used to test for differences in time spent comparing across the Death attribute between 
those who compared across the Long Term Risk attribute and those who did not.  Comparison time differed 
significantly across groups (F(1,98) = 6.44, p = .013), but participants who compared across the Long Term Risk 
attribute spent significantly more time comparing across the Death attribute than did those who did not compare 
across the Long Term Risk attribute (M = 20.84 seconds, SD = 40.75;  M = 73.30 seconds, SD = 102.30).  Therefore, 
there did not seem to be separate groups within the sample, some of whom thought the Long Term Risk attribute to 
be the most important, and the other of whom thought the Death attribute to be most important. 
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A Chi Square analysis found that participants who compared across the Long Term Risk 
attribute were significantly more likely to select the optimal option X2 (1, N = 100) = 11.52, p = 
.001 (see Table 5).  In other words, participants who used a more lexicographic strategy, 
comparing across the most important option, were most likely to identify and select the best 
decision option.  This finding explains why previous analyses found that participants who used 
an avoidant decision strategy were more likely to select the optimal option.  A lexicographic 
heuristic strategy is less extensive and involves comparison across attributes; therefore, the 
decision strategy measure used previously would have coded any heuristic strategy as attribute-
based decision information processing.   
   A subsequent analysis looked at whether there were differences by condition in the 
amount of time participants spent comparing across the Long Term Risk attribute.  An 
ANCOVA (controlling for demographics) found that participants in the high threat condition 
spent significantly more time comparing across the Long Term Risk attribute (F [1, 92] = 4.62, p 
= .034; see Figure 5).  This finding suggests that participants in the high threat condition were 
more likely to use an effective heuristic decision strategy, and, combined with the finding that 
the lexicographic strategy led to the selection of an optimal decision strategy, explains why high 
threat participants were more likely to select the optimal option.  High threat participants were 
more likely than low threat participants to use an effective heuristic decision strategy. 
  
3.10 Moderators 
 
 To further explore the relationship between condition and the decision strategy used by 
participants, I explored two potential moderators. 
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3.10.1 Trait anxiety 
 
 To explore the role of trait anxiety in participants’ information processing behavior, I 
conducted linear regression analyses to assess whether the interaction of trait anxiety and 
condition could further explain the relationship between condition and decision strategy 
selection.  I conducted two separate analyses using two measures of decision strategy: the 
original decision strategy measure (smaller means more attribute-based) and the post-hoc 
measure of time spent comparing within the Long Term Risk attribute.   
The first model included education (as a control variable), trait anxiety level, condition, 
and the cross-product of trait anxiety and condition. Trait anxiety did not significantly moderate 
the relationship between condition and decision strategy, but the p-value indicated a trend toward 
moderation (B = .69, t = 1.93, p = .056). 
The second model included education (as a control variable), trait anxiety level, 
condition, and the cross-product of trait anxiety and condition. Trait anxiety significantly 
moderated the relationship between condition and Long Term Risk comparison time (B = -.86, t 
= -2.33, p = .022) such that among participants with a lower level of trait anxiety, condition had 
a stronger effect on time spent comparing within the Long Term Risk attribute.  Participants with 
higher levels of trait anxiety were less affected by the manipulation (see Figure 6).  
 
3.10.2 Impulsivity 
To explore the role of impulsivity in participants’ decision strategy selection, I conducted 
a linear regression analysis to assess whether the interaction of impulsivity and condition could 
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further explain the relationship between condition and decision strategy selection.  Again, I 
conducted two separate analyses using two measures of decision strategy: the original decision 
strategy measure (smaller means more attribute-based) and the post-hoc measure of time spent 
comparing within the Long Term Risk attribute.   
The first model included education (as a control variable), impulsivity, condition, and the 
cross-product of impulsivity and condition. Impulsivity did not significantly moderate the 
relationship between condition and decision strategy (B = .73, t = 1.02, p = .31). 
The second model included education (as a control variable), impulsivity, condition, and 
the cross-product of impulsivity and condition. Impulsivity significantly moderated the 
relationship between condition and Long Term Risk comparison time (B = -1.52, t = -2.076, p = 
.041) such that among participants with a lower level of impulsivity, condition had a stronger 
effect on time spent comparing within the Long Term Risk attribute.  Participants with higher 
levels of impulsivity were less affected by the manipulation (see Figure 7). 
 
3.11 Summary of post-hoc analyses 
 
 The post-hoc analyses explored the process data in order to explain why and how high 
threat participants made better decisions than did low threat participants.  The results suggest that 
the decision strategy measure accurately differentiated between systematic and heuristic 
strategies, and that high threat participants were more likely than low threat participants to use an 
effective lexicographic decision strategy.  The analyses also found that trait anxiety and 
impulsivity moderated the relationship between condition and decision strategy.    
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4.0 DISCUSSION 
 
 
Current medical practice emphasizes fully informing patients about the risks and benefits 
of treatment options (Sheridan et al., 2004) and giving patients the opportunity to make their own 
health care treatment decisions (American Medical Association, 2006).  As patients make 
treatment decisions, they are likely to confront threatening information about illness and death.   
Although research and theory has focused on how threatening health information affects 
information processing (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Witte, 1992), existing evidence 
does not specifically address whether and how exposure to threatening information affects the 
way that patients process decisions, select decision strategies, and choose options.  The current 
study was designed to experimentally manipulate exposure to threatening information in order to 
explore how health decision processing and option selection changes under threat.   
The proposed motivated decision processing model predicted that when patients face a 
threatening health decision, they will experience dual motivations: effort motivation and 
defensive motivation.  The model predicted that these dual motivations would lead to biased but 
effortful processing.  Specifically, the hypotheses stated that individuals exposed to threatening 
health information would focus on reassuring information, avoid threatening information, use 
attribute-based decision strategies, and ultimately show an increased use of effortful but biased 
processing.   
Only some of the findings supported the hypotheses.  As expected, participants in the 
high threat condition were more likely to avoid threatening information than were participants in 
the low threat condition.  High threat participants did not spend more time than low threat 
participants looking at reassuring information.  Participants in the high threat condition were also 
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more likely to use an attribute-based decision strategy; however, this finding is difficult to 
interpret because participants who used an attribute-based strategy were more likely to select the 
best option.  Since a fundamental assumption of the study was that participants who used an 
extensive decisions strategy would select the best option, the finding that a heuristic strategy was 
more accurate than a systematic strategy leads to questions about the validity of the decision task 
and limits the ability to interpret the decision strategy findings.    
The current findings did not support the hypothesis that participants in the high threat 
condition would engage in a greater level of effortful processing.  Participants in the high threat 
and low threat conditions seemed to expend the same amount of effort in processing information; 
they spent the same amount of time making the decision and looked at the same amount of 
information.  Thus, participants exposed to threatening health information did not engage in 
more effortful processing, but they did seem to process the information in a biased manner.   
The results did not support the exploratory hypotheses.  Participants in the high threat 
condition were no more likely than those in the low threat condition to select the status quo 
option, and emotion variables did not mediate the relationship between condition and decision 
outcome. 
 
4.1 Unexpected findings 
 
One of the underlying assumptions of the model was that processing in an effortful but 
biased manner would lead to poorer decisions: attribute-based decision strategies allow decision 
makers to avoid trade-offs, and making trade-offs is widely thought to be the hallmark of high 
quality decision processing (Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Keren & Bruin de Bruin, 2003).  Therefore, 
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it was surprising to find that participants who used a more attribute-based strategy were more 
likely to select the best treatment option.  In this specific decision situation, a heuristic strategy 
was actually more accurate than a systematic strategy.  Another unexpected result was the 
finding that high threat participants were more likely than low threat participants to select the 
best treatment option.   
The study was designed so that the best option would be selected by participants who 
processed systematically; therefore, the finding that participants who used a more attribute-based 
strategy made more accurate decisions draws into question the validity of the decision processing 
task.  Many studies have found that systematic information processing is more accurate than 
heuristic processing (Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Keren & Bruine de Bruin, 2003).  This study found 
the opposite: a heuristic strategy was more accurate than a systematic strategy.  This finding 
limits the interpretation of the decision processing data.  I was therefore unable to accurately test 
the hypothesis that threatening information led to heuristic processing of information (since, in 
this study, heuristic processing led to a superior decision).    
In addition to questions about the validity of the decision task, these unexpected findings 
also led to additional questions about the decision strategy selected by participants.  Although I 
was unable to completely achieve this study’s goal of exploring whether exposure to threatening 
health information affected decision strategy selection, I went on to conduct post-hoc analyses 
aimed at understanding why high threat participants made better decisions and why attribute-
based processing led to better decisions.   
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4.2 Decision strategy 
 
 
After finding that both high threat participants and participants using an attribute-based 
strategy were more likely to select the optimal option, I explored the type of attribute-based, 
heuristic strategy selected by high threat participants.  Previous research using the MouseLab 
process-tracing tool assessed decision strategy by looking at how frequently decision-makers 
compared between options and attributes (Luce et al., 1997; Reisen, Hoffrage, & Mast, 2008), 
resulting in a continuous measure of attribute-based and option-based strategy.  I used this 
measure in assessing decision strategy, but I was unable to find a precedent in the literature for 
using MouseLab to get a more detailed picture of the type of heuristic strategy (e.g. satisficing, 
lexicographic) used by participants.  Using post-hoc analyses, I discovered that participants in 
the high threat condition used a type of lexicographic strategy: they identified the most important 
attribute (long term risks) and spent time comparing across that attribute, presumably looking for 
the option with the best value on that attribute.    
Participants in the high threat condition used an effective heuristic (lexicographic) 
strategy, in that participants who compared across the long term risk attribute were more likely 
than those who did not to select the best treatment option.  Previous empirical research has 
shown that in some decision contexts, heuristic decision strategies can require less effort and be 
just as accurate as systematic strategies (Payne et al., 1988).  This study found that a more 
heuristic decision strategy was actually more accurate than a systematic strategy.  However, it is 
important to note that this result may be an artifact of the way the decision table was structured.  
In this decision, comparing across the long term risk attribute clearly led participants to the best 
option.  If, however, the best option had been worse than the other options on that specific 
attribute, the lexicographic strategy may not have been effective. 
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Previous research has shown that the same individual will use different decision 
strategies in different decision contexts (Payne, 1982).  However, little is known about what 
factors predict the selection of an attribute-based decision strategy when an individual is under 
threat.  In post-hoc analyses, I explored whether individual differences might provide insight into 
what types of individuals were most affected by the threat manipulation.  Analyses showed that 
both trait anxiety and impulsivity moderated the relationship between condition and decision 
strategy.  The interaction (Figure 6) showed that the manipulation had less of an effect on highly 
anxious individuals; they used a more heuristic strategy in both the low and high threat 
conditions.   Analyses of impulsivity showed a nearly identical interaction pattern (Figure 7).  
Individuals low in impulsivity used a more systematic decision strategy in the low threat 
condition, and individuals high in impulsivity used a more heuristic strategy across both 
conditions.  Individuals high in trait anxiety or impulsivity seemed to use a more heuristic 
strategy regardless of whether they had been exposed to threatening health information.   
The impulsivity finding is consistent with work showing that a lack of perseverance, or 
the inability to remain focused on a task, is one of impulsivity’s primary components (Whiteside 
& Lynam, 2001).  It makes sense that a general inability to focus on a decision making task 
would lead to greater use of a heuristic decision strategy in both threatening and non-threatening 
decisions.   
The finding that higher levels of trait anxiety led to use of a heuristic decision strategy 
regardless of threat condition at first seems inconsistent with previous research showing that trait 
anxiety leads to an attentional bias towards threatening information (Blanchette & Richards, 
2010).  We may have expected participants higher in anxiety to process the information more 
carefully, in a systematic manner.  However, the previous research was not conducted in a 
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decision making context, and it is possible that highly anxious individuals experience decisions 
as more threatening, in general, than do less anxious individuals.  In the current study, trait 
anxiety was significantly correlated with baseline skin cancer worry (r = .28, p  = .006) and the 
PANAS negative emotion scale (r = .22, p =.041); therefore, participants with higher levels of 
trait anxiety may have experienced more negative emotion than less anxious participants did 
while processing the decision, regardless of what condition they were in.  
 
4.3 Emotion as a mediator 
 
 
 Mediational analyses did not support the exploratory hypothesis that emotional variables 
(e.g., worry, negative affect, anticipated regret) would mediate the relationship between 
condition and biased information processing.  This is surprising, given that the exposure to 
threatening information did raise the level of negative emotion experienced by high threat 
participants.  It is possible that although exposure to threatening information raised negative 
emotion, it also raised the level of an unmeasured variable, such as motivation, that led to 
avoidance of threatening information and use of a heuristic decision strategy. 
 It is also possible that the self-report measures of emotion used in this study were not 
reliable.  Self-report measures of emotion have some conceptual limitations: individuals vary in 
their ability to be aware of and accurately report their own emotional experience, and thus 
reported emotions may have varied meaning from person to person.  Self-report measures of 
emotion have also been criticized for not accurately assessing the level of emotion felt in the 
moment; some authors have argued that self-report measures merely reflect how the individual 
felt after the manipulation (Sayette, Wertz, Martin, Cohn, Perrott, & Hobel, 2003).  In this study, 
worry was measured immediately after exposure to the scenario and negative affect and worry 
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were measured immediately after participants read over the decision information.  Thus, the 
measures may have not accurately reflected how participants felt in the very moments that they 
were processing the information.  For example, participants may have experienced some 
moments of fear, relief, and dissonance while processing the information, but the current study’s 
emotion measures only reflect how participants felt after processing the information.  Because 
research suggests that decision makers engage in choice justification after making a difficult 
decision (Festinger, 1957), post-decision measures may not accurately reflect the emotion that 
occurred during decision processing.  The current study’s finding that participants in the high 
threat condition reported higher levels of decision satisfaction may reflect an attempt on the part 
of high threat participants to deal with the cognitive dissonance they likely experienced while 
making difficult decision trade-offs.  Future research could use measures such as facial affect 
coding (Sayette et al., 2003), designed to assess moment by moment emotion, to assess whether 
specific types of emotions that occur during decision processing could be mediating the 
relationship between exposure to threatening health information and decision processing and 
outcomes. 
 
4.4 Implications for Motivated Decision Processing Model 
 
 
 The current findings partially support the proposed motivated decision processing model.  
Overall, the findings generally support the model’s proposition that individuals making a 
difficult health decision process decision information in a defensive and biased manner.  
However, the findings do not support the proposition that threatening health information will 
lead decision makers to expend a greater overall effort towards processing decision information, 
or that this processing will lead to poor decision making. 
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4.4.1 Threatening information leads to defensive processing 
 
The model proposed that exposure to threatening health information would motivate 
defensive information processing, and result in avoidance of threatening information, a focus on 
reassuring information, and the use of a decision strategy that allowed decision makers to avoid 
making trade-offs.  Evidence supporting two of the three predicted outcomes partially supports 
the idea that threatening health information leads to biased, defensive information processing.   
Participants in the high threat condition did seem to avoid looking at threatening information; 
compared to participants in the low threat group, they spent a smaller proportion of time looking 
at the most threatening information (Chance of Immediate Death). Participants in the high threat 
condition also used a more attribute-based decision strategy, supporting the model’s proposition 
that the motivation to process defensively will result in the use of decision strategies that allow 
decision makers to avoid making difficult trade-offs.    However, the finding that participants 
who used more attribute-based strategies made more accurate decisions limits interpretation of 
the finding that threatening information led to the use of attribute-based decisions strategies.     
Participants in the high threat condition did not spend a greater proportion of time 
looking at reassuring information.  The reassuring information (Benefits of Treatment) was about 
the beneficial cosmetic effects of the treatment options, and it is possible that the reassuring 
information was not vivid or consequential enough to draw participants’ attention.  Another 
possibility is that the defensive motivation only prompted avoidance of threat and trade-offs, and 
it did not extend to a search for reassurance.  Previous research looking at biased processing of 
threatening health messages did not separate out attention to threatening information and 
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reassuring information (Gleicher & Petty, 1992; Liberman & Chaiken, 1992), so the current 
finding that threatened participants did not seek out reassuring information is a new one.  The 
finding should be replicated. 
 
4.4.2 Threatening information leads to effortful processing 
 
The results did not support the model’s proposition that individuals making a threatening 
health decision would expend a greater overall effort in processing decision information.  
Participants in both conditions spent the same amount of time looking at the decision information 
and looked at the same amount of information. 
Why did participants in the high threat condition not expend more overall effort making 
the decision?  First, it is possible that the hypothetical decision in the current study was not 
threatening or realistic enough.  Patients who make a real-life medical treatment decision may be 
more likely to expend greater overall effort towards the decision than patients making a less 
threatening treatment decision.  Another possibility is that the model is incorrect in its 
proposition that threatened patients will make a greater overall effort in processing information, 
and that it is more accurate to state that patients facing threatening information will make a 
greater focused effort.  Compared to the low threat condition, participants in the high threat 
condition spent more time comparing across one of the most important attributes.  Thus, they 
seemed to expend more effort focusing on a specific (and important) piece of information. 
I included effort motivation in the model based on evidence that 1) people believe that 
thinking harder equates to thinking better (Lerner & Tetlock, 2003) and 2) threatened individuals 
report or show a greater processing effort (Ditto & Lopez, 1992, Lieberman & Chaiken, 1992; 
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Luce et al., 1997).  I thought that patients facing threatening health decisions would be motivated 
to convince themselves that they made a good decision, and that expending greater overall effort 
and processing in a biased manner would allow them to avoid threats and trade-offs while still 
feeling satisfied with the decision.  However, it seems that threatened participants instead 
concentrated their effort on using a heuristic decision strategy.  This finding is inconsistent with 
previous work finding that threatened participants made a greater overall effort processing 
decision information (Luce et al., 1997), but it is consistent with evidence that threatened 
individuals focus their information processing effort on criticizing, defending against, or 
replicating information that they find threatening (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Eagly et al., 2001; Ditto 
et al., 1998).  The current evidence suggests that compared to low threat participants, high threat 
participants engaged in information processing that was not more effortful, but was instead more 
efficient.  High threat participants expended effort in a more focused and accurate manner than 
did low threat participants.  At the same time, high threat participants reported greater levels of 
decision satisfaction.  It is possible that high threat participants felt more motivated to make a 
good decision and chose a heuristic decision strategy that was efficient, accurate, and also 
allowed them to avoid difficult trade-offs.    
 
 
4.5 Implications for the default bias 
 
 
 Results showed that participants selected the default option significantly more frequently 
than expected, even though the default option was always a suboptimal choice.  That bias, 
however, was unaffected by condition; participants in both conditions were equally likely to 
select the default option. 
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 The overall tendency is consistent with a number of other studies that show a default or 
status quo bias (Choi et al., 2004; Fleming et al., 2010; Kressel & Chapman, 2007; Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2003; Moshinsky & Bar-Hillel, 2010; Samuelson & Zeekhauser, 1988).  Many 
experiments that offer a default or status quo option confound that option with an implicit 
recommendation, and, as others have suggested (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003), people may 
interpret default options as implicitly recommended by authorities.  Therefore it is difficult to 
know why participants choose a default.  For example, Kressel and Chapman (2007) found that 
the presence of a sample living will led to a biased preference for the wording expressed in the 
sample.  Participants may have interpreted the sample living will as an implicit recommendation 
for the preferences expressed in the will, or they may have used the sample wording out of a 
desire to avoid making an active decision.  However, as in many of these studies, it is impossible 
to separate out the motivational factors.   
 In the current study, the confound between implicit recommendation and pure default 
was disentangled.  The default option did not include an implicit recommendation and the 
presence of a default option was simply and ambiguously explained by saying, “Because there 
are multiple options, the computer randomly selected one.  You may select a different option if 
you prefer.”  These results suggest that part of the preference for the status quo may result from a 
desire to avoid action, and cannot be solely attributed to implicit recommendation. 
 
 
4.6 Decision quality 
 
 
One of the goals of this study was to gain an understanding of how exposure to 
threatening information affects the quality of a decision.  However, participants in the current 
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study who used an attribute-based strategy to make their decision were more likely to select the 
best decision option.  In other words, participants who used a less optimal decision strategy were 
more likely to arrive at the optimal decision option.  This finding makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions as to the overall quality of their decisions.  In the decision literature, measurement of 
decision quality is both complicated and controversial (Keren & Bruine de Bruin, 2003).  Some 
researchers advocate looking at outcome to assess decision quality (Hershey & Baron, 1995), 
and other researchers prefer to assess decision processing (Edwards, Kiss, Majone, & Toda, 
1984). 
Among researchers who discuss empirically measuring decision quality, there seems to 
be a consensus that decision makers who consider and make trade-offs make better quality 
decisions (Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Keren & Bruine de Bruin, 2003).  By that standard, 
individuals in the high threat condition in the current study made fewer trade-offs and therefore 
made poorer quality decisions.     
However, evaluation of quality can also depend on the decision goals, and those goals 
can differ depending on the situation and the perspective of the person judging the decision.  In 
the case of a health treatment decision, an important goal for both the patient and provider is for 
the patient to select the optimal treatment option (if there is a clearly better option).  By that 
standard, participants in the current study who chose the optimal option made a high quality 
decision.  An additional goal, from an ethical and legal perspective, is for patients who make 
important treatment decisions to be fully informed of the risks and benefits of possible treatments 
(e.g. deciding to undergo bariatric surgery) and to deliberately consider the treatment options.  
To meet the goal of being fully informed, patients would ideally use a systematic decision 
strategy.   
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The results of the current study suggest that exposure to threatening information can lead 
individuals to avoid threatening information and  shift to a more heuristic strategy as they assess 
health decision information.  Although a heuristic strategy can be accurate, the use of an 
attribute-based, heuristic strategy suggests that decision makers under threat may not be carefully 
considering trade-offs as they make their decision.  This suggests that they may not be meeting 
the ethical goal of being fully informed and engaging in deliberate processing of information.      
 
 
4.7 Strengths 
 
 
This study contributes to the existing research on health information processing and 
decision making by identifying how exposure to threatening health information changes decision 
making processes.  This study is the first to experimentally manipulate level of threat and look at 
the resulting changes in decision information processing.  In addition, no previous studies on 
health treatment decisions have used process variables to understand how decision processing 
changes under threat, and this study used new analyses of process data to identify the specific 
decision strategy used by participants.  As a result, this study was able to demonstrate that 
individuals who are exposed to threatening health information avoid threatening information and 
decision trade-offs while using a more heuristic decision strategy to process information.   
This study also contributed to research on the use of default options in health care.  
Specifically, the study design uniquely removed the implicit recommendation from a default 
health treatment option, and showed that in a health decision context, a default is attractive even 
without the implicit recommendation.   
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Another strength of the study is in its assessment of moderators.  This study is the first to 
find that trait anxiety and impulsivity moderate the effect of threatening health information on 
decision information processing.   
This study’s method and use of process measures are major strengths.  The detailed 
process information allowed more analyses and provided a deeper understanding of how 
participants processed the information than would have been possible using only outcome 
measures. 
 
 
4.8 Limitations 
 
 
 The current study includes a number of limitations.  The sample used in this study was a 
sample of convenience, and the majority of participants worked at the University of Pittsburgh or 
the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.  Thus, participants may not have been 
representative of the larger community of people over the age of 40.  Participants were self-
selected and volunteered for the study, therefore participants may have been more curious about 
and interested in health decision making than the average community member. 
 A major limitation of the study arises from the finding that participants who used a more 
heuristic decision strategy were more likely to select the optimal option.  This finding is the 
opposite of what was expected given the existing literature (Frisch & Clemen, 1994; Payne & 
Bettman, 2001).  It is possible that the layout of information in the decision table was such that a 
heuristic style of processing made it more likely for participants to select the best option.  It is 
also possible that the decision processing measure did not accurately capture the level of 
cognitive effort that participants put into processing the information.  In either case, the result 
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that heuristic processing was more accurate when compared to systematic processing limits the 
interpretation of the data.   
 There are also alternative explanations for the findings.  First, it is possible that the 
manipulations differentially affected participants’ processing capacity.  Specifically, participants 
who received the high threat manipulation may have experienced worried and anxious cognitions 
that then led to a decrease in their ability to process information.  This temporary processing 
capacity deficit would have led to high threat participants being more likely to use a simple, 
heuristic processing strategy.  However, if high threat participants had a lower processing 
capacity than low threat participants, we would have expected to see differences in the total 
amount of time participants looked at information.  Given that both conditions spent the same 
amount of time processing the information, it is unlikely that changes in processing capacity can 
explain the results. 
Another alternate interpretation of the findings is based on the manipulation’s focus on 
participants’ own feelings about skin cancer.  Research has shown that when the level of 
personal involvement is high, individuals process information more systematically than when 
personal involvement is low (Borgida & Howard-Pitney, 1983).  Because the current study 
manipulated threat by manipulating the level of personal involvement of the participants (i.e., 
participants in the high threat condition imagined themselves making a difficult health decision 
and those in the low threat condition were not instructed to do so), it is possible that the effect of 
the manipulation on information processing was due to personal involvement rather than level of 
threat.  However, high threat participants used a more heuristic processing strategy and than did 
low threat participants, and previous research on the personal involvement effect showed that 
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personal involvement led to more systematic processing.  Therefore it is unlikely that the effect 
of the manipulation was due to the effect of personal involvement.      
 The health threat manipulation used in the study consisted of two parts: a threatening 
(high threat condition) or less-threatening (low threat condition) scenario prior to presentation of 
the decision table, and a higher (high threat condition) or lower (low threat condition) level of 
decision conflict within the decision table.  Because there were two components to the 
manipulation, it is not clear whether both components contributed to the observed effects or 
whether only one component accounted for the observed effects.  Self-report measures showed 
that participants in the high threat condition perceived information in the scenario as more 
threatening than information in the decision table (5.44 [1.42] vs 3.28 [1.59], t = 9.35, p < .001), 
but since emotion did not mediate the effect of condition on outcomes, it is not clear that those 
differences identify the scenario as the more powerful component of the manipulation.  It is 
possible that the higher level of decision conflict in the high threat condition prompted the use of 
a heuristic strategy as a way of cognitively simplifying the decision and avoiding trade-offs, 
independent of any emotional experience.  Future studies could separate out the two parts of the 
current manipulation in separate experiments, thus isolating the effects of each manipulation. 
 It is also possible that the differences in level of decision conflict between the two tables 
may explain the processing differences between conditions.  In order to manipulate the level of 
decision conflict, the information in the low threat and high threat tables was slightly different.  
In addition to affecting decision conflict, these differences may have also made the high threat 
decision more cognitively challenging.  Participants who faced a more cognitively challenging 
decision may have changed their decision strategy and focused on different parts of the 
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information.  Therefore, it is possible that the differences in processing by condition could be 
explained by the differences in the decision tables rather than by the level of threat.        
 Several limitations are related to the fundamental limitations of using a hypothetical 
decision and a structured decision table.  A hypothetical decision is inherently less threatening 
than a real health treatment decision, and although the manipulation in this study was effective in 
inducing worry and perceived threat, it is possible that the information processing effects found 
may not accurately model the way a patient processes information in a real decision context. In 
addition, the decision table is a somewhat artificial way of making a health treatment decision, 
and it is possible that the hypothetical nature of the decision and the format of the decision 
interfered with natural decision making patterns.  For example, because the decision table was 
structured for the participants, the decision process did not accurately model the full decision 
process.  The decision table effectively eliminated the “structuring” part of the decision process, 
and I was thus unable to assess whether exposure to threatening information affected the way 
individuals set up a decision.   
In addition, some researchers have raised questions about the external validity of 
computerized process tracing tools.  A recent study experimentally demonstrated that 
information presented in an open style led to greater use of systematic strategies, whereas the 
same information presented in a structured table format led to greater use of heuristic strategies 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008).  Replicating the current study using a more open style of 
information presentation would help to establish the external validity of the findings. 
The operational definitions of some of the decision process constructs used in this study 
are new and have no precedent in the literature.  Although the measures of effort (i.e., time spent 
looking at parts of the decision table and the number of boxes opened) have been used in other 
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studies as operational definitions of effort (Drolet & Luce, 2004; Luce et al., 1997), the specific 
assumption that ‘Benefits of Treatment’ is reassuring and ‘Likelihood of Death,’ is threatening is 
unique to this study and has not been used in prior research.  In addition, although the original 
decision strategy measure that identified systematic and heuristic strategies has been used in 
prior research (Drolet & Luce, 2004; Glockner & Betsch, 2008; Luce et al., 1997; Reisen et al, 
2008), the post-hoc analyses included operational definitions of lexicographic and satisficing 
strategies that have not been used in previous research.  Thus, it is possible that some of this 
study’s unique measures are not valid.  Future research can explore these operational definitions 
further in order to assess their validity.      
 The selection of skin cancer treatment as the hypothetical disease is a possible limitation.  
After participating in the study, a number of participants reported to the experimenter that they 
did not find skin cancer to be an especially frightening type of cancer.  It is possible that a skin 
cancer diagnosis would not feel as threatening to participants as, for example, a breast cancer 
diagnosis.  Using a more frightening type of cancer would have increased the level of threat and 
may have led to a stronger effect of the manipulation.  Future research in this area could explore 
whether the degree of threat and type of disease have differential effects on decision processing.   
A limitation of this study that may have affected the assessment of mediation between 
emotional variables and outcomes is that emotion was measured by self-report.  The self-report 
measures may not have accurately measured how participants felt in the very moments they 
looked over the decision information, and a desire to justify their own decision may have 
affected how they reported their own emotions.  
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4.9 Summary and future directions 
 
 
 Patients face health treatment decisions that are complex, difficult, and involve 
information about threatening topics such as illness and death.  Researchers and clinicians have 
developed decision aids as a way to help patients make complex treatment decisions (O’Connor 
et al., 1999), but not much is known about the decision process itself.  The overarching goal of 
this study was to explore how decision processing changes when patients are exposed to 
threatening information during the decision making process.  Consistent with previous work 
showing that threat leads to defensive information processing, the results of this study showed 
that exposure to threatening health information leads to the avoidance of threatening decision 
information and decision trade-offs.  The results also demonstrate that individuals exposed to 
threatening information use a more heuristic decision strategy, however the finding that 
participants who used a heuristic decision strategy were more likely to select the best option 
limits the interpretation and generalizability of the finding.  Replicating the current study but 
manipulating which treatment option is optimal and which type of decision strategy will lead to 
the optimal option will further help to determine the quality of decisions made under threat. 
 These results also have implications for informed consent procedures.  Given the ethical 
importance of informed consent in research (U.S. Office for Human Research Protections, 2010; 
American Psychological Association, 2010) and medicine (Berg, Appelbaum, Parker, & Lidz, 
2001), it is important to consider whether the presence of threatening information affects how 
deliberately participants and patients process consent forms, and how fully they comprehend the 
risks and benefits.  The results suggest that people who read threatening health information may 
not systematically process informed consent forms; they may avoid threatening information 
about risks, and they may use a heuristic decision strategy to decide whether to consent to 
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treatment or participate in a study.  Future research could focus specifically on how exposure to 
threatening information affects processing of an informed consent form. 
 It is also important to continue exploring individual difference factors that may affect the 
relationship between exposure to threatening information and decision processing.  This study 
found that trait anxiety and impulsivity moderated the relationship between threat and decision 
processing.  Given that patients who are high in trait anxiety or impulsivity may process 
decisions in a more heuristic manner whether or not they have been exposed to threatening 
information, health care providers may want to take extra care in ensuring that these patients 
have understood all the risks of specific treatments.  Patients high in trait anxiety or impulsivity 
may also experience more health problems than the general population, and they may need 
greater assistance with health decisions.  Future research can further explore how people with 
high levels of trait anxiety or impulsivity process health care decisions, and also look at other 
potential moderators such as depression status. 
  The current study was not able to answer the question of why threatening information led 
to a change in decision processing, and future research should continue to explore that question.  
Adding more sophisticated measures of emotion, such as using facial coding or fMRI may 
uncover the motivational factors leading to information processing changes. 
 One of the major limitations of the current study is that it was carried out in a lab setting 
and it is not known whether the results will apply to a real life decision setting.  Extending the 
research into a real health decision setting will not only help us to understand the generalizability 
of the findings, but may also provide insight into how decision makers under threat seek out 
information and structure their decisions.  For example, are people who look at threatening 
information more efficient at identifying the most important aspects of the decision and 
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incorporating those attributes into their own decision structure?  In addition, this study looked 
only at decision information processing, but future research could explore how exposure to 
threatening information changes how and where patients seek information.  For example, up to 
eight out of ten internet users have looked up health information online (Fox, 2006), and many 
people use online health support groups to gather and discuss health information (Tannis, 2008).  
Future research could explore the use of social information sources, both online and in real life, 
to determine whether exposure to threatening health information changes the way people seek 
out health information.   
 Finally, the results of this study highlight the importance of gaining an understanding of 
how decision processing changes under threat.  Knowing that exposure to perceived threats can 
lead to patients’ avoidance of frightening, but important, information about treatments can help 
researchers and clinicians develop more effective decision aids and communication tools.  This 
study’s successful use of process measures also demonstrates the value of incorporating process 
variables into health information processing studies.  Other researchers studying the effect of 
threatening information and emotion on health information processing may benefit from using 
process measures. 
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Table 1. Illustration of Mouselab decision table for skin cancer treatment decision (high threat 
condition).   
Treatments Side effects Risk of 
immediate 
death 
Short-term 
risks 
Long-term 
risks 
Benefits of 
treatment 
Deep tissue 
surgery 
Severe pain 
at site of 
treatment; 
spend one 
week in 
hospital  
There is 
some risk 
of 
immediate 
death 
during 
surgery 
procedure 
Prominent 
scarring; 
excellent 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells 
removed. 
Permanent 
scarring; 
there is a 
low risk of 
cancer 
recurrence  
This is a 
brief course 
of treatment; 
no need for 
follow-up 
care 
Shallow 
tissue 
surgery 
Moderate 
pain at site 
of 
treatment; 
spend one 
morning in 
hospital 
There is 
some risk 
of 
immediate 
death 
during 
surgery 
procedure 
Temporary 
visible 
scarring; 
Very good 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells removed 
Moderate 
risk of mild 
permanent 
scarring; 
low risk of 
cancer 
recurrence  
Minimal 
scarring; 
outpatient 
procedure; 
can be back 
to regular life 
right away 
Laser 
removal 
Red marks 
at site of 
treatment; 
skin around 
treatment 
site can 
become 
itchy 
There is a 
low risk of 
immediate 
death 
during 
treatment 
procedure 
Temporary 
visible 
scarring; 
Very good 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells 
removed. 
Moderate 
risk of 
cancer 
recurrence; 
Low risk of 
permanent 
pain in 
area. 
This 
treatment 
produces no 
scarring and 
is a painless 
procedure 
Topical 
medication 
Itchiness 
and 
moderately 
painful 
burning 
sensation at 
treatment 
site  
Very low 
risk of 
immediate 
death from 
allergic 
reaction to 
medication 
Temporary 
visible 
scarring; 
Very good 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells killed. 
Moderate 
risk of 
recurrence; 
moderate 
risk of 
permanent 
pain in 
area.   
Little 
scarring; also 
reduces 
appearance 
of fine lines 
and wrinkles.   
Oral 
medication 
Mild joint 
pain and 
headaches 
for duration 
of 
treatment 
(ten weeks) 
Low risk 
of 
immediate 
death from 
allergic 
reaction to 
medication 
Mild 
headache for 
one week. 
Excellent 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells killed. 
Low risk of 
permanent 
scarring; 
Very low 
risk of 
cancer 
recurrence 
This 
treatment 
produces 
little 
scarring;  
also reduces 
facial acne. 
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Table 2. Illustration of Mouselab decision table for skin cancer treatment decision (low threat 
condition). 
Treatments Side effects Risk of 
immediate 
death 
Short-term 
risks 
Long-term 
risks 
Benefits of 
treatment 
Deep tissue 
surgery 
Moderate 
pain at site 
of 
treatment; 
spend one 
week in 
hospital  
There is a 
low risk of 
immediate 
death 
during 
surgery 
procedure 
Some 
scarring; 
excellent 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells 
removed. 
Permanent 
scarring; 
there is a 
low risk of 
cancer 
recurrence  
This is a 
brief course 
of 
treatment; 
no need for 
follow-up 
care 
Shallow 
tissue 
surgery 
Severe pain 
at site of 
treatment; 
spend one 
morning in 
hospital 
There is 
some risk 
of 
immediate 
death 
during 
surgery 
procedure 
Temporary 
visible 
scarring; 
Good 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells 
removed 
Moderate 
risk of mild 
permanent 
scarring; 
moderate 
risk of 
cancer 
recurrence  
Minimal 
scarring; 
outpatient 
procedure; 
can be back 
to regular 
life right 
away 
Laser 
removal 
Red marks 
at site of 
treatment; 
skin around 
treatment 
site can 
become 
itchy 
There is 
some risk 
of 
immediate 
death 
during 
treatment 
procedure 
Temporary 
visible 
scarring; 
Very good 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells 
removed. 
Moderate 
risk of 
cancer 
recurrence; 
Low risk of 
permanent 
pain in 
area. 
This 
treatment 
produces no 
scarring 
and is a 
painless 
procedure 
Topical 
medication 
Itchiness 
and 
moderately 
painful 
burning 
sensation at 
treatment 
site  
Low risk 
of 
immediate 
death from 
allergic 
reaction to 
medication 
Temporary 
visible 
scarring; 
Good 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells killed. 
Moderate 
risk of 
recurrence; 
moderate 
risk of 
permanent 
pain in 
area.   
Little 
scarring; 
also 
reduces 
appearance 
of fine lines 
and 
wrinkles.   
Oral 
medication 
Mild joint 
pain and 
headaches 
for duration 
of 
treatment 
(ten weeks) 
Low risk 
of 
immediate 
death from 
allergic 
reaction to 
medication 
Mild 
headache 
for one 
week. 
Excellent 
chance that 
all cancer 
cells killed. 
Low risk of 
permanent 
scarring; 
Very low 
risk of 
cancer 
recurrence 
This 
treatment 
produces 
little 
scarring;  
also 
reduces 
facial acne. 
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Table 3.  Descriptive statistics and scale descriptions. 
 
Variable High Threat 
Mean (SD) 
Low Threat 
Mean (SD) 
T-test Alpha Scale Description/ Item Examples 
 
Baseline skin 
cancer worry 
3.11 (1.58) 3.25 (1.48) -.47 .92 4 items 
7 pt Likert scale 
“How worried [anxious, fearful, 
concerned] are you about skin cancer?” 
Confidence in 
judgment 
4.39 (1.44) 4.02 (1.58) 1.23 .94 2 items 
7 pt Likert scale 
“How confident do you feel about your 
judgments [assessment] of skin cancer 
treatments?” 
Trait anxiety 
(TAI) 
15.40 (8.34) 14.02 .80 .91 20 items 
4 pt Likert scale 
“I feel nervous and restless.” 
“I am “calm, cool, and collected.” 
“I feel inadequate” 
Barratt 
Impulsivity 
Scale 
55.90 (8.12) 55.33 (8.55) .34 .78 30 items 
4 pt Likert scale 
“I plan tasks carefully” 
“I have “racing” thoughts.” 
“I squirm at plays or lectures.” 
“I change hobbies.” 
 
Post manipulation scales: 
PANAS 
 
Negative mood 
 
 
Positive mood 
 
 
24.35 (10.26) 
 
 
26.75 (7.63) 
 
 
16.76 (4.91) 
 
 
27.55 (6.62) 
 
 
4.50** 
 
 
-.55 
 
 
.93 
 
 
.87 
24 items 
5 pt Likert scale 
“Indicate the extent you feel this way 
right now, that is, at the present 
moment…” 
“Interested” 
“Scared” 
“Alert” 
Decision 
satisfaction 
24.60 (3.77) 23.00 (3.50) 2.20* .87 6 items 
5-pt Likert scale 
“The decision I made was the best 
decision possible for me personally.” 
“I am satisfied that I made a good 
decision.” 
Decisional 
conflict (larger 
is more 
conflict) 
29.36 (9.42) 32.62 (9.01) -1.78# .93 16 items 
5 pt Likert scale 
“I know the benefits of each option.” 
“I am clear about the best choice for 
me.” 
“This decision is easy for me to make.” 
**p < .01 
* p < .05 
# p < .10 
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Table 4.   
 
Individual Analysis of Variance for Condition Predicting Process Measures. 
 
Source 
 
df 
 
F 
 
p 
 
Time to decision 
 
 
1 
 
.14 
 
.71 
Number of boxes 
opened 
 
1 .10 .76 
Proportion of time 
spent looking at 
Benefits 
 
1 2.15 .15 
Proportion of time 
spent looking at 
Chance of 
Immediate Death 
1 3.86* .053 
 
Proportion of time 
spent looking at 
Side Effects 
 
1 
 
6.53** 
 
.012 
 
Decision strategy 
 
 
1 
 
.007 
 
.93 
Note.  Each analysis reported above was completed separately.  All analyses controlled for 
education.  Proportion of time variables were calculated by dividing the amount of time spent 
looking at Benefits or Death information by the total time spent making the decision. 
*p = .05. 
**p = .01 
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Table 5.  Results of the Chi Square test of the relationship between participants who compared 
across the Long Term Risk attribute and participants who selected the optimal option.  The table 
includes observed and expected frequencies. 
 
Observed 
  Select best option? 
 
 
  Yes 
 
No Total 
Compared 
across Long 
Term Risk 
attribute? 
 
Yes 
 
 
33 (25.9) 
 
41 (48.1) 
 
74 
 
No 
 
2 (9.1) 
 
24 (16.9) 
 
26 
 
 
Total 
  
35 
 
65 
 
100 
 
Note. Expected frequencies in parentheses. 
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7.0 APPENDIX 2: FIGURES 
Figure 1: Motivated decision processing model
Exposure to 
threatening 
health 
information
Effort motivation
Defensive 
motivation
Biased 
systematic 
processing
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Figure 2. Study procedure 
 
Qs: Skin 
cancer 
worry, 
confidence in 
judgment;  
risk 
perceptions; 
TAI 
Participant 
reads scenario: 
Experimental 
and Control 
Manipulation 
check (How 
threatening 
was 
scenario?; 
How worried 
are you about 
skin cancer?) 
Participant 
views 
decision 
table 
Manipulation 
check: (How 
frightening 
was info?;  
How 
threatening 
was info?; 
PANAS) 
Participant 
makes 
decision 
 
Qs: Decision 
satisfaction; 
impulsivity; 
demographics; 
Decision 
Conflict Scale 
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Figure 3. Number of participants who selected the best option as a function of condition. 
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Figure 4.  Mean time spent comparing across attributes 
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Figure 5. Mean time spent comparing across attributes by condition. 
 
 
 
*p < .05 
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Figure 6.  Graph of the interaction between trait anxiety and condition.   
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Figure 7.  Graph of the interaction between impulsivity and condition.   
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